Peace and Security Review, Vol.1 No. 2 - International Centre for ...

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68 Peace and Security Review Vol.1, No.2, Second Quarter, 2008 Significant portions of the youth drop out of college and become easy prey for revolutionary movements. In sum, only by addressing the problems of corruption, inadequate infrastructure, economic stagnation and peace and order problem can the government hope to effectively undercut a significant source of militancy ⎯ poverty and joblessness, failure to do so mean a steady supply of local recruits to militant outfits. If the Philippine government wants to win the “Moro hearts and minds,” the government needs to give Moros hope. Accommodating popular Moro demands for genuine political autonomy and facilitating the process toward full revival of the democratic governance and public accountability would help to rebuild Moro public confidence in the Central government. Facilitating the return of displaced Moros in other neighboring country such Malaysia and to the neighboring provinces for example, would help resolved most of the social and political grievances. The Philippine government should also try to re-examine its security policy in the region by giving preference to Moros qualified to lead military command units in ARMM. Implementing the provision of the peace agreement on the creation of regional command 57 that provides opportunity for the people of the autonomous region to be involved in its security can bolster public confidence. Coordination within and between Intelligence Services History suggests that intelligence and equally important, counter-intelligence, is central to success of counter-insurgency warfare and counter terrorism operations. After examining seven case studies, Hoffman and Morrison-Taw found that in each campaign, success was directly proportional to the emphasis placed on intelligence. 58 That effective intelligence is most dependent on the effective functioning of two critical elements of a successful counter-insurgency and counter terrorism campaign: a well organized command and coordination structure, and recognition of the public’s role in the struggle. In Northern Ireland, for instance, the government’s poor relations with the population, and the bureaucratically entrenched command and coordination structures hindered intelligence efforts. 59 This is more or less the case in the counter insurgency and counter terrorism efforts in Bangsamoro Southern Philippines. The unified command is anything but unified, and the people are alienated both by the inconsistent government policies and, (most 57 RA 9054, section 11. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. Vol.1, No.2 2008 pp.49-76
Taharudin Ampatuan Philippines’ Counter Insurgency and Terrorism 69 importantly) by the government’s inability to provide them with better and secured lives. Intelligence (especially the critical and accurate human intelligence), consequently, is sparse and dissemination ineffective. A unified command (Western Mindanao Command) and several task forces such as the “Task Force Comet” for counter terrorism specifically organized to hunt less than 400 hundred members of the Abu Sayaf Group for close to ten years, and yet the military has failed to curb and neutralize the terrorist group. While the government managed to kill some of its key leaders ⎯ recent beheading of 6 civilians and an ambush that cause the lives of 29 soldiers was seen by government critics reason enough to confirm that contrary to the claim of the AFP, ASG is still a force to reckon with. 60 Had the policy makers or the security officials looked to the successful counter-insurgency campaigns for strategic guidance, they would have realized that the solution to poor intelligence lay in re-building the local police capability in ARMM to support effectively the counter insurgency operations. Muslim Moro Military and police conducting operations is better than a gun-totting soldiers from the Christian Philippines, who are always seen as occupier. At present, the ARMM police are ill-equipped ⎯ organizationally, materially, and mentally ⎯ to combat the terrorists. While the peace agreement caused the integration of 2,500 former MNLF fighters to the police force, they were not used to help curbed the terrorist threat, but mostly underutilized as they remain distrusted. Another 5,000 former MNLF were integrated in the Armed Forces of the Philippines were also underutilized. The vision was a locally recruited security force working to establish peace and order in the region. The vision has failed to materialize as most of the forces have been stationed outside the region. On the problem of synchronizing and achieving intelligence coordination, National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA), which is a coordinating agency at strategic level, should have left the operating units of the military and police to collect intelligence. Instead, it is operating at tactical level through its regional offices, and creating a structure that affects the military and police chain of command and communication. Strategic intelligence should focus on providing support for tactical intelligence and complement it with strategic intelligence response. It should have formulated the priority intelligence tasks, and use the regional offices for monitoring its implementation, coordination and synchronization. 60 ICPVTR 2007 Annual Report, Philippine Portion. Vol.1, No.2 2008 pp.49-76
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