Peace and Security Review, Vol.1 No. 2 - International Centre for ...

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60 Peace and Security Review Vol.1, No.2, Second Quarter, 2008 transferred to augment 4 th Infantry Division. All three divisions were placed under the Operational Command of the CEMCOM. 34 These three Divisions did not defeat the MNLF, but it provided sufficient time for the government to organize a unified response. Part of the effort was to consolidate the organizational ease provided by the declaration of Martial Law on September 11, 1971. This provided the Marcos government the ability to place development agencies directly supporting military campaigns under a central command. One tangible offshoot of this policy was a massive reconstruction program, dubbed the “Reconstruction and Development Program in Muslim Mindanao” that provided an inter-agency coordinative framework for development initiatives. 35 Marcos has not only succeeded in luring the MNLF through its Chairman Nur Misuari to sign a peace agreement 36 in 1976 at Tripoli Libya, but also succeeded in taking advantage of the internal rift between the traditional leaders and the MNLF Moro progressive leaders led by Nur Misuari to rift animosity. Marcos like the US, used the Datus and their influence in both the military and non-military campaigns to assist the Philippine government. The Philippine government introduce the Barangay Self-Defense Unit (BSDU), a community based para-military forces that allowed the armed supporters of the Datus (traditional leaders) to legally acquire firearms and defend their communities. In the political front, Marcos implemented his own interpretation of the Tripoli agreement in 1976, and unilaterally established two autonomous region in Mindanao ⎯ Region 9 and 12. This policy was complemented by a massive infrastructure development, such as roads, schools and scholarship for Muslims. Marcos used the Martial Law regime to make the Philippine Constabulary and the Integrated National Police as a fourth major service command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), alongside the Army, Navy and Air force. To further establish a unified command structure, Marcos created the Armed Forces of the Philippines Southern Command which created a unified command structure for the whole Mindanao Island. Marcos had the opportunity to defeat the insurgency, but failed to deliver on the promised political and development issues. Some suggests that temporary success of divide and rule will finally calmed the secessionist movement. Instead, he further 34 Ampatuan, 2002. 35 Presidential Task Force on the Reconstruction and Development of Muslim Mindanao, Vol. 1, 1973, pp. i-iii. 36 “The Tripoli Agreement,” MNLF Website, accessed on 25 February 2008, http://mnlf.net/ The_Tripoli.htm. Vol.1, No.2 2008 pp.49-76
Taharudin Ampatuan Philippines’ Counter Insurgency and Terrorism 61 alienated the Moro population making future peace efforts difficult. So while there was a unified command, there was no political will to implement necessary reforms. Post Martial Law Until the attack and burning of a progressive Christian town of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay in 1995, perpetrated by the ASG, the command structure of the AFP was seen to be effectively addressing the patches of conflict posed by the MILF (Islamists). However the emergence of radical Islamist Abu Sayaf Group and its alleged connections with trans-national terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah put the security infrastructure of Philippine government to test. The new operational threat posed by deliberately targeting civilians caught the government off-guard. The Abusayaf activities, which crossed the line between political violence and criminality, challenge the coordinative structure of the Philippine government. The Philippine National Police, which has been made independent of the AFP and placed under the newly created Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) in 1998, proved to be no match for the highly experience, well armed Moro rebels. The breaking of the unified command structure did not help matters. This latter problem was a reversion to the past. The military, police, and local government all had problems coordinating responses to the crisis. For instance in the burning of Ipil Town by the ASG, under the existing arrangement, the Police is supposed to be responsible for addressing act of terrorism under the Peace and Order Council framework. 37 However, since the burning of Ipil town resulted in deaths and disaster, this incident could be seen as a National Disaster Coordinating Council mandate, 38 which is headed by the Department of National Defense, whose operating arm is the Armed Forces of the Philippines. These problems can only be solved through legislation, however, none of the existing agencies wants to initiate reforms as they could lose responsibility for areas and hence turf. Thus the confused status quo remains. In the Martial law period, the Philippine National Police was under the Armed Forces of the Philippines; hence deployment of police to support insurgency campaign was easier. After the Martial Law, the Philippine Police operational supervision was transferred to the Department of Interior and Local Government. This is further complicated by the Local Government 37 Executive Order_309 “National Peace and Order Council and Republic Act 7260,” Local Government Code of 1998. 38 PD 1566, “Philippine Disaster preparedness program,” issued o n 11 June, 1978. Vol.1, No.2 2008 pp.49-76
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