Peace and Security Review, Vol.1 No. 2 - International Centre for ...

S. Mahmud Ali Post-Cold War Great Power Security Dynamics 35
‘threat’ potential, encouraging American military action which persuaded Beijing
to take counter-measures which, in turn, led to further US action. American
‘exaggeration’ of China’s strategic nuclear arsenal was one example. DoD
reports regularly noted China’s new missiles were mobile, allegedly posing
greater threat, ignoring the fact that a majority of Chinese missiles had always
been mobile and targeted accordingly by DoD. Scientific estimates suggested
a Chinese attack on 20 American cities with 20 ICBMs would cause 40m
casualties, blanketing much of North America in radioactive fallout. 7 A US
first-strike on China’s 20 ICBM silos would inflict 11m casualties with similar
radioactive outcome. Mutual deterrence would be easy to achieve. Unlike
America and the Soviet Union, China was moving very slowly in modernizing
its nuclear forces, and was unlikely to go beyond credible deterrence. Washington
and Beijing needed to cooperate in reducing mutual threat-perceptions and
maintain strategic stability.
Beijing’s view of the international security environment appeared to be less
anxious than it had been in recent years. It expected progress in addressing
‘the serious imbalances’ in power alignments. “The major international forces
compete with and hold each other in check,’ but they also cooperate and
coordinate, and ‘draw on each others’ strength.” 8 China would modernize its
military in keeping with scientific-technological developments and the changing
strategic environment, but only to secure its own defence ⎯ ‘Security issues
related to energy, resources, finance, information and international shipping
routes are mounting,’ Beijing noted. The PLA launched a three-stage programme
to build networked forces capable of winning modern wars by 2050, three
decades after China becomes a ‘well-off society in an all-round way.’ So, only
defence of the homeland ground, air and maritime spaces until mid-century.
By then, China would be a different country. That is Beijing’s narrative.
America’s security discourse partially resonated with this view. A Defence
Science Board (DSB) task force reviewing US nuclear stockpiles, production
complex, management systems and transformation of ‘the nuclear enterprise’
reported that a possible confrontation with Russia ⎯ not China ⎯ was the
most important reason for retaining a robust nuclear deterrent: ‘Russia retains
the capability to destroy the US in 30 minutes or less.’ 9 Moscow’s emphasis
on nuclear war-fighting capability, its difficult democratic transition and
foreign policy differences with Washington on matters of important national
interests warranted close attention. China, too, merited watching; given tensions
7 Kristensen, Norris, McKinzie, 2006, pp.1-13.
8 China ‘s National Defence, State Council, December 2006.
9 Report on Nuclear Capabilities, DSB, December 2006, p.l2.
Vol.1, No.2 2008 pp.27-47