Walking together: Healing and hope for Colombian refugees

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of people living in absolute poverty and the deep socio-economic inequalities than with the armed
groups themselves. Violence does not just come out of the barrel of a gun; it is also fuelled by the
suffering of those who live in miserable conditions. Desperate people use violence as a means to seek
change and the poor can view membership in an armed group as a source of employment or power.
At the same time, violence also aggravates the inequalities. Particular economic groups, drug cartels
and large land-owners created private armies in Colombia to protect their interests and to expand their
monopoly over economic resources. Several studies have shown the connection between AUC presence
and the concentration of property, drug trafficking and a consolidation of economic mega-projects
that violate the interests of the local population. The Consulting Office for Human Rights and Forced
Displacement – CODHES – estimates that the AUC and the drug cartels took approximately 5 million
hectares of land by force between 1997-2003.
Political Control: Alongside the economic interests that motivate the creation of private armies,
the dominant political leaders’ desire to maintain power and repress minority opposition groups has
strengthened these armed actors. Selective assassinations and disappearances committed by the
paramilitaries weaken alternative political groups and maintain the power imbalance weighted towards the
traditional political-economic elite, thus breaking down the public democratic process. During the second
semester of 2006 the Supreme Court of Justice began to process dozens of cases of congressional
members, government functionaries and regional politicians accused of maintaining alliances with the
AUC, thus highlighting a historic reality that the media suddenly scandalized as “para-politics.” In regions
where the insurgent groups have gained control, similar patterns arise. The FARC and the ELN use threats
and assassinations to maintain their influence over local and regional governments.
The Role of the State: Overall, the State has not maintained a permanent presence in much of
Colombia’s territory and therefore illegal armed groups (guerrilla and paramilitary groups) have filled
these gaps. In addition, with regards to the private armies propagated by powerful elite, the State has
often turned a blind eye rather than seeking to regain monopoly over the use of force. The state has not
functioned as an impartial entity protecting the common good, but rather has allowed certain groups to
use private armed actors to impose their interests. Moreover, human rights organizations have extensively
documented the collaboration between State Armed Forces and the private defence groups.
Psychological Factors – individual and collective trauma: Personal psychological elements have
also played a significant role in the growth of armed groups. The FARC initiated in response to the
Colombian State bombing of an “autonomous civilian commune” in 1964. Decades later FARC leaders
point back to the losses suffered then as the instigation for their war. The principle leaders of the AUC,
as well as many of their combatants, all suffered insurgent attacks on their family members. As the
different armed groups absorb this chosen trauma into their identity, they feel entitled, as victims, to
always act with reference to the initial violation against them. The desire for revenge and fear of future
attacks generates a psychological framework that supports systematic violence against a profoundly
“bad” enemy. In a context of around 98% impunity, the armed groups easily convince themselves that
they are acting in favour of justice by eliminating the other groups. This deep sense of “righteousness”