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2007 Issue 1 - New York City Bar Association

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L A W Y E R ’ S R O L E I N C O R P O R A T E G O V E R N A N C E<br />

litigation under the securities laws should be reestablished by Congress,<br />

reversing the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision eliminating such<br />

liability in Central Bank of Denver N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver<br />

N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994). We believe that consideration of such legislation<br />

at this time would be premature (see pp. 180-183, below). It is important,<br />

first, to assess the impact on lawyer conduct of the SEC’s interpretation<br />

and enforcement of its lawyer conduct rules. In addition, the courts<br />

need to resolve the present uncertainty concerning the extent to which<br />

lawyers (and other “secondary actors”) may be held as primary violators<br />

of the securities laws for conduct previously thought to constitute aiding<br />

and abetting (see Full Report at pp. 42-45).<br />

* * *<br />

VII<br />

THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN CONDUCTING INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS*<br />

A. Background and Context<br />

1. Introduction<br />

When conducting an internal investigation on behalf of a company,<br />

investigative and company counsel face many challenges, from determining<br />

the proper scope of the inquiry, to making findings of fact and recommending<br />

remedial action, to addressing the expectations and demands<br />

of regulators and prosecutors. Some commentators have suggested that<br />

good corporate governance dictates that counsel must follow all leads of<br />

possible unlawful conduct, address every instance of wrongdoing and<br />

cooperate fully with the authorities. Others take as their starting point<br />

the interests of the corporation’s shareholders, as determined by their<br />

appointed representatives (the Board of Directors or a committee of the<br />

Board), and use as their guiding principle the obligation to maintain<br />

shareholder value.<br />

Often these two approaches will not be in conflict. An independent,<br />

comprehensive investigation, coupled with full cooperation with government<br />

authorities, will be consistent with, and indeed mandated by, the<br />

need to preserve shareholder value. There are other circumstances, however,<br />

where a company may properly determine that, on balance, an investigation<br />

that has no limitations will result in a waste of assets, or that<br />

* The footnotes in this section are numbered as in the Full Report. This Section VII of the<br />

report was prepared by the Task Force’s subcommittee on internal investigations: Daniel<br />

Kramer, Chair, and members Wayne Carlin, Eric Corngold, Charles Gerdts, <strong>Bar</strong>bara Gillers,<br />

Lewis Liman, Claudius Sokenu, Betty Whelchel and Frederic Yerman.<br />

T H E R E C O R D<br />

180

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