2007 Issue 1 - New York City Bar Association
2007 Issue 1 - New York City Bar Association
2007 Issue 1 - New York City Bar Association
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L A W Y E R ’ S R O L E I N C O R P O R A T E G O V E R N A N C E<br />
litigation under the securities laws should be reestablished by Congress,<br />
reversing the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision eliminating such<br />
liability in Central Bank of Denver N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver<br />
N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994). We believe that consideration of such legislation<br />
at this time would be premature (see pp. 180-183, below). It is important,<br />
first, to assess the impact on lawyer conduct of the SEC’s interpretation<br />
and enforcement of its lawyer conduct rules. In addition, the courts<br />
need to resolve the present uncertainty concerning the extent to which<br />
lawyers (and other “secondary actors”) may be held as primary violators<br />
of the securities laws for conduct previously thought to constitute aiding<br />
and abetting (see Full Report at pp. 42-45).<br />
* * *<br />
VII<br />
THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN CONDUCTING INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS*<br />
A. Background and Context<br />
1. Introduction<br />
When conducting an internal investigation on behalf of a company,<br />
investigative and company counsel face many challenges, from determining<br />
the proper scope of the inquiry, to making findings of fact and recommending<br />
remedial action, to addressing the expectations and demands<br />
of regulators and prosecutors. Some commentators have suggested that<br />
good corporate governance dictates that counsel must follow all leads of<br />
possible unlawful conduct, address every instance of wrongdoing and<br />
cooperate fully with the authorities. Others take as their starting point<br />
the interests of the corporation’s shareholders, as determined by their<br />
appointed representatives (the Board of Directors or a committee of the<br />
Board), and use as their guiding principle the obligation to maintain<br />
shareholder value.<br />
Often these two approaches will not be in conflict. An independent,<br />
comprehensive investigation, coupled with full cooperation with government<br />
authorities, will be consistent with, and indeed mandated by, the<br />
need to preserve shareholder value. There are other circumstances, however,<br />
where a company may properly determine that, on balance, an investigation<br />
that has no limitations will result in a waste of assets, or that<br />
* The footnotes in this section are numbered as in the Full Report. This Section VII of the<br />
report was prepared by the Task Force’s subcommittee on internal investigations: Daniel<br />
Kramer, Chair, and members Wayne Carlin, Eric Corngold, Charles Gerdts, <strong>Bar</strong>bara Gillers,<br />
Lewis Liman, Claudius Sokenu, Betty Whelchel and Frederic Yerman.<br />
T H E R E C O R D<br />
180