2007 Issue 1 - New York City Bar Association

I N T E R N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y A F F A I R S
takes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating
to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,
and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict
and effective international control.” Although that language intentionally
left the nuclear weapon states’ commitment vague and indefinite, in
recent years, states parties have clarified what the obligation entails, and the
nuclear weapons states have agreed to arms control/disarmament measures.
105 Nuclear weapons states most recently made such commitments in
the Final Declaration of the NPT 2000 Review Conference. 106 They include
the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, negotiating a
treaty to ban production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and making
the reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals irreversible and verified.
If these steps are taken by all nuclear weapon states, they will also
help to reduce and secure nuclear materials and explosives that would be
available for acquisition or diversion by terrorists. In recent years, though,
the nuclear weapons states, and particularly the United States, have
backpedaled on the 2000 commitments. The May 2005 NPT Review Conference
failed to reach any agreement, in large part due to deep division
over the current status of the commitments. 107 The breakdown of the Review
Conference was followed by the failure to agree on any measures or
even language regarding non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear
and other weapons of mass destruction at the September 2005 World Summit.
108 One consequence has been an inability to advance action on widely
agreed non-proliferation goals like enhancing the inspection powers of
the IAEA, or to take on the difficult task of coming to agreement on
proposals to control the spread of nuclear fuel cycle technology.
(2) 1972 The Biological Weapons Convention 109
Parties to this treaty (the “BWC”) are prohibited from developing,
105. See John Burroughs & Elizabeth Shafer, The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, in RULE OF
POWER OR RULE OF LAW, supra note 74 at 24-29.
106. 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, Final Document, May, 2000.
107. See David E. Sanger, Month of Talks Fails to Bolster Nuclear Treaty, N. Y. Times, May
28, 2005.
108. Jim Wurst, Nonproliferation, Disarmament Matters Dropped from U.N. Summit Document,
GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE, September 14, 2005.
109. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972,
Art. 13(2), 26 UST 583, 1015 UNTS 163.
T H E R E C O R D
50