2007 Issue 1 - New York City Bar Association
2007 Issue 1 - New York City Bar Association
2007 Issue 1 - New York City Bar Association
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L A W Y E R ’ S R O L E I N C O R P O R A T E G O V E R N A N C E<br />
Those concerns must be considered by counsel advising the corporation<br />
in every instance. There are costs to hiring counsel who is too close<br />
to current management. If true wrongdoing has occurred, counsel with<br />
ties to management might not be best suited to discovering it and rooting<br />
it out. If the company chooses wrong and there is wrongdoing where<br />
it was not believed to exist, the failure to act through independent counsel<br />
can be expensive. 199 Even where there is no true wrongdoing, the use of<br />
regular counsel to conduct the investigation can cause credibility problems,<br />
and possibly lead regulators or the Board to conclude that a new<br />
investigation must be conducted by independent counsel.<br />
There are, however, some investigations where the benefit of hiring a<br />
law firm that is familiar with the company, or has prior experience in the<br />
subject matter of the investigation, will outweigh the disadvantages arising<br />
out of the prior relationship. Counsel knowledgeable of the company<br />
and its personnel, and familiar with the regulatory and factual framework,<br />
will have a shorter learning curve, will get up to speed more quickly<br />
and efficiently on a matter, and presumably will be better suited to evaluate<br />
evidence in context than counsel who lacks this background. This is a<br />
benefit both from the standpoint of shareholder value and from the standpoint<br />
of corporate governance.<br />
Once again, counsel for the corporation should lay these choices out<br />
for those supervising the investigation and let them make their own choice.<br />
During the course of the investigative process, they should periodically<br />
assess whether outside counsel remains independent of the influence of<br />
interested directors and officers.<br />
2. How should the scope of the investigation be determined<br />
After determining who should supervise an investigation and which<br />
counsel should be retained, the client must define the scope of the investigation.<br />
This issue usually is, and should be, resolved by the corporation<br />
in consultation with investigative counsel. It is an extremely important<br />
issue that can be addressed only with sensitivity to the facts giving rise to<br />
the investigation itself.<br />
State and corporate fiduciary duty law and federal securities law and<br />
other federal obligations provide relevant guideposts. State corporate law<br />
Acting General Counsel supervising the investigation continued to be an active partner of the<br />
firm allegedly charged with investigating. See D-15, below.<br />
199. See Report of Investigation in the Matter of Cooper Companies, Inc., SEC Rel. No. 34-<br />
35082, 58 S.E.C. 591, 594-96 (Dec. 12, 1994) (faulting internal investigation where co-chair<br />
and CFO of company had refused to cooperate with outside counsel’s investigation, and the<br />
Board of Directors did not act).<br />
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