27.12.2014 Views

2007 Issue 1 - New York City Bar Association

2007 Issue 1 - New York City Bar Association

2007 Issue 1 - New York City Bar Association

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

L A W Y E R ’ S R O L E I N C O R P O R A T E G O V E R N A N C E<br />

Those concerns must be considered by counsel advising the corporation<br />

in every instance. There are costs to hiring counsel who is too close<br />

to current management. If true wrongdoing has occurred, counsel with<br />

ties to management might not be best suited to discovering it and rooting<br />

it out. If the company chooses wrong and there is wrongdoing where<br />

it was not believed to exist, the failure to act through independent counsel<br />

can be expensive. 199 Even where there is no true wrongdoing, the use of<br />

regular counsel to conduct the investigation can cause credibility problems,<br />

and possibly lead regulators or the Board to conclude that a new<br />

investigation must be conducted by independent counsel.<br />

There are, however, some investigations where the benefit of hiring a<br />

law firm that is familiar with the company, or has prior experience in the<br />

subject matter of the investigation, will outweigh the disadvantages arising<br />

out of the prior relationship. Counsel knowledgeable of the company<br />

and its personnel, and familiar with the regulatory and factual framework,<br />

will have a shorter learning curve, will get up to speed more quickly<br />

and efficiently on a matter, and presumably will be better suited to evaluate<br />

evidence in context than counsel who lacks this background. This is a<br />

benefit both from the standpoint of shareholder value and from the standpoint<br />

of corporate governance.<br />

Once again, counsel for the corporation should lay these choices out<br />

for those supervising the investigation and let them make their own choice.<br />

During the course of the investigative process, they should periodically<br />

assess whether outside counsel remains independent of the influence of<br />

interested directors and officers.<br />

2. How should the scope of the investigation be determined<br />

After determining who should supervise an investigation and which<br />

counsel should be retained, the client must define the scope of the investigation.<br />

This issue usually is, and should be, resolved by the corporation<br />

in consultation with investigative counsel. It is an extremely important<br />

issue that can be addressed only with sensitivity to the facts giving rise to<br />

the investigation itself.<br />

State and corporate fiduciary duty law and federal securities law and<br />

other federal obligations provide relevant guideposts. State corporate law<br />

Acting General Counsel supervising the investigation continued to be an active partner of the<br />

firm allegedly charged with investigating. See D-15, below.<br />

199. See Report of Investigation in the Matter of Cooper Companies, Inc., SEC Rel. No. 34-<br />

35082, 58 S.E.C. 591, 594-96 (Dec. 12, 1994) (faulting internal investigation where co-chair<br />

and CFO of company had refused to cooperate with outside counsel’s investigation, and the<br />

Board of Directors did not act).<br />

2 0 0 7 V O L. 6 2 , N O. 1<br />

191

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!