2007 Issue 1 - New York City Bar Association
2007 Issue 1 - New York City Bar Association
2007 Issue 1 - New York City Bar Association
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L A W Y E R ’ S R O L E I N C O R P O R A T E G O V E R N A N C E<br />
be found in the <strong>New</strong> <strong>York</strong> Stock Exchange’s (“NYSE” or “Exchange”) recent<br />
pronouncement that members will be charged if they do not comply<br />
with their twin affirmative duties to (1) cooperate with Exchange reviews<br />
and investigations, and (2) fully disclose violations of Exchange rules and<br />
the securities laws. NYSE Information Memo No. 05-77: Factors Considered<br />
in Determining Sanctions (Oct. 7, 2005).<br />
Appendix H to this report (pp. 209-225, infra) reviews in detail the<br />
DOJ, SEC, and the NYSE corporate-prosecution policies, the recently revised<br />
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations, as well as Section 10A<br />
of the 1934 Act, which imposes reporting obligations on outside auditors.<br />
The NASD and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and<br />
others also have similar guidelines. 186 Together these complimentary and<br />
competing forces shape today’s enforcement climate. But in conducting<br />
internal reviews, lawyers and clients should also appreciate that government<br />
expectations have clearly risen since their issuance.<br />
In sum, today public companies and their lawyers face a demanding<br />
regulatory and enforcement environment. Government and market regulators<br />
are serious about rooting out corporate wrongdoing, and restoring<br />
and maintaining trust in our markets. In aggressively investigating, charging,<br />
and sanctioning misconduct, they have come to expect that companies<br />
will fully cooperate with them and self-report problems. Recent enforcement<br />
trends and government statements, in fact, indicate that companies<br />
will be punished if they impede governmental investigations or otherwise<br />
do not provide the level of cooperation expected by prosecutors<br />
and regulators. Similarly, corporations are both encouraged and rewarded<br />
for installing strong corporate governance and ethics programs that can<br />
help deter and identify violations. In this climate of compliance, internal<br />
investigations are more prevalent and important than ever.<br />
3. The ethical and legal framework<br />
The lawyer has an obligation, incident to his or her membership in<br />
the <strong>Bar</strong>, to provide unflinching legal advice, even in those circumstances<br />
where the client does not want to hear it. Under our system of justice, that<br />
function of the private bar is integral to ensuring compliance with the<br />
at 6 (“In practice, companies are finding that they have no choice but to waive these privileges<br />
whenever the government demands it.”).<br />
186. See, e.g., NASD, Sanction Guidelines, available at http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/<br />
enforcement/documents/enforcement/nasdw_011038.pdf; CFTC, Enforcement Advisory: Cooperation<br />
Factors in Enforcement Division Sanction Recommendations, available at http://<br />
www.cftc.gov/files/enf/enfcooperation-advisory.pdf (“CFTC Cooperation Factors”).<br />
T H E R E C O R D<br />
184