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Viper Pilot_ A Memoi..

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attlefield thinking, and they instilled this in their students. So, cutting units off<br />

from their commanders would force independent thought, and this was something<br />

most Iraqis didn’t handle well. Battles are chaotic enough anyway, and without<br />

direction from above many Iraqi units initially did nothing at all.<br />

Then there was saturation. KARI worked okay against the ten or twenty<br />

aircraft-strike packages from the Iran-Iraq War, but we had over three hundred<br />

aircraft hitting them every day and they were overwhelmed. Throw in the<br />

communications disruption and jamming that had them chasing false targets, and<br />

it’s obvious why we gained air supremacy in two days.<br />

When their MiGs and Mirages did take off to gloriously battle the infidel<br />

invaders (that would be us again), none of them ever came back. I helped chase a<br />

flight of Mirage fighters into Iran one day as they bravely ran away. Another<br />

morning, I watched two MiG-23s fly into the ground as they tried to shake off a<br />

horde of U.S. jets swarming in their direction. So, in addition to their technical<br />

shortcomings, the Iraqis had a critical morale problem.<br />

We’d gone into this more or less ad hoc in 1991, but by 2003 we’d figured it<br />

out. Extreme adaptability is one of the most defining characteristics of the<br />

American military, and we adapted. We also function very well as small<br />

independent units that don’t require a lot of supervision. In fact, supervision is<br />

usually highly resented.<br />

Now, with lots of time between the wars, we had the luxury of really picking the<br />

threat apart and studying it. Remember, the goal of Operation Desert Storm had<br />

been to save Kuwaiti and Saudi oil, not to invade Iraq. But we knew the next war<br />

would be different. Next time we’d have to go to Baghdad.<br />

No one liked rotating to Saudi or Kuwait twice per year, but we made the most<br />

of it. It was, in fact, terrific practical experience and afforded us a superb<br />

opportunity to know the terrain, the weather, and build up our knowledge of a<br />

threat we’d face eventually. We still hated it.<br />

The Weasels from the 20th Fighter Wing did this from Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.<br />

This base was left over from Desert Storm and sat south of Iraq on the Persian<br />

Gulf. Dhahran wasn’t too bad for several reasons. First, it was only a hundred miles<br />

from the Iraqi border, and in a region so vast this made response times very quick<br />

and our missions that much shorter. Second, unlike the rest of the Kingdom, the<br />

city of Dhahran actually had a few amenities. The downtown area had been built<br />

with petrodollars and boasted good restaurants and even a shopping mall. Because<br />

of the oil fields, the locals were accustomed to Westerners and were relatively<br />

tolerant.

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