Viper Pilot_ A Memoi..

combat and most of them had no idea what to do. Also, no one except pilots and
police had weapons.
Fortunately, the security force reacted quickly, and so did the medical folks. As
we rounded the corner, there were already armed cops gathering around the
shattered gap in the fence. The wounded were getting triaged on the street. Others
were heading toward the tottering building to see if they could help pull bodies out
or assist the injured. The police realized the danger and eventually cleared
everyone away.
Nineteen Americans died that night. Scores of others were wounded.
“We will pursue this,” President Clinton declared. “Those who did this must not
go unpunished.”
Right.
Well, that didn’t happen. The 4404th Wing Commander, Brigadier General
Terry Schwalier, eventually even got a second star. Not at first, of course. Someone
had to be held accountable, and, quite correctly in my opinion, the blame fell on
Schwalier, the man ultimately responsible for the safety and security of the Wing.
Even though this was 1996 and long before 9/11 made bin Laden and al-Qaeda
household names, there’d been obvious signs that the situation was deteriorating
and that American servicemen in Saudi Arabia were at risk. The previous
November, for instance, a car bomb detonated in Riyadh outside the office of the
Program Manager for the Saudi National Guard. Five Americans had been killed
and another thirty people wounded. All through the winter and early spring of 1996
there had been bombings and violence in Bahrain. In January 1996, an Air Force
Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) report specifically mentioned the threat of
vehicle bombs along the Khobar perimeter.
Despite these warnings, Khobar remained exposed and vulnerable in June 1996.
Two sides of Khobar were bordered by a Saudi housing area. The north end (where
the bomb would explode) was an open park for locals. Schwalier did conclude that
the threat of a car bomb necessitated enhanced security so the single gate into
Khobar Towers ended up looking like the Maginot Line. Pillboxes, wire, armed
guards, etc. . . . all very impressive but what about the miles of exposed perimeter
around the rest of the complex Even a simple-minded Saudi terrorist is smart
enough not to attack the strongest part of a fence.
Eventually thirty-six of the thirty-nine AFOSI recommendations were
implemented at Khobar, but it was too little and too late. For instance, a “Giant
Voice” public-address system that could’ve been used to warn of attacks was
incomprehensible to anyone inside a building on the Khobar complex. Also, even if