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our paperwork, and were back in the squadron. This was a long, low building that<br />
had been built during the Cold War and smelled like it hadn’t been used since the<br />
Cuban missile crisis. It was “hardened,” or reinforced, with six-feet-thick walls to<br />
withstand the nuclear attack that never came. <strong>Pilot</strong>s coming back from missions<br />
would drop off their paperwork at the duty desk and then wander into the<br />
intelligence vault for yet another debrief. This was a sealed room with no windows.<br />
There were lots of secret computers, and all the classified information pertaining to<br />
our aircraft, weapons, and missions was kept here. Maps covered the walls with the<br />
latest and greatest updates on MiGs and SAMs. We’d pass on our enemy<br />
encounters and then discuss the target area.<br />
Finally, after all this, we’d find an empty briefing room and discuss the flight in<br />
detail. We’d talk through each phase of the mission, tear apart the good and bad<br />
aspects, and arrive, hopefully, at ways to make it better. We’d dissect our<br />
videotapes and analyze each weapon that was dropped, shot, or fired. From this,<br />
and any intelligence reports, we’d arrive at a preliminary Battle Damage<br />
Assessment. This would get passed up to the Mission Planning Cell, which would<br />
use all the gathered information to plan the next round of missions.<br />
I’d followed this process throughout my tactical career in training, so it was<br />
nothing new. This time, however, we concentrated almost exclusively on the<br />
combat engagements and our weapons effectiveness. The non-tactical stuff was<br />
limited to ensuring a smoother flow of a hundred aircraft back and forth into enemy<br />
territory. Like not having the Turkish Air Force run practice intercepts on us, or<br />
making certain that the Patriot batteries were not firing on auto tomorrow. Little<br />
things like that.<br />
Three hours after we’d landed, we’d beaten today’s mission to death and were<br />
planning tomorrow’s. It was to be a similar strike package against the welldefended<br />
city of Kirkuk. SA-2s and SA-3s, of course, with a possible SA-6 and lots<br />
of Triple-A. The F-15s had claimed a dozen Iraqi fighters with no losses, but they<br />
were anticipating more of a fight tomorrow.<br />
All the results from today were put together against the desired results for<br />
tomorrow. This was all dumped on a small group of fighter pilots attached to the<br />
Combined Wing Staff. Usually majors and lieutenant colonels, these guys were<br />
thoroughly frustrated, because they were planning the war and not fighting.<br />
Nevertheless, they took all this information, plus whatever general guidance was<br />
provided by the Coalition Headquarters, the Pentagon, the White House, the God<br />
of War, etc., and put together The Plan. This was published in a thick sheaf of<br />
papers called an Air-Tasking Order (ATO), or “Frag,” and it delineated targets,