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Viper Pilot_ A Memoi..

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one of the rooftop sentries could detect an attack (and one did see the tanker truck<br />

pull up on June 25) there was no quick way to sound an alert. There was no siren<br />

that could be activated by the sentries, because the wing leadership decided it<br />

would offend the local Saudis. Any information or suspicious activity had to be<br />

called in to Central Security Control, then passed to the Wing Operations Center<br />

and finally to the Wing Commander before a decision could be made. The<br />

“system” was, in a word, useless.<br />

I freely acknowledge it was a tough security situation and the likelihood of<br />

Saudi cooperation was pretty small, but I never saw evidence that Schwalier tried<br />

to press the issues with them. Or with the American chain of command. I contend<br />

the root problem was his failure to take a hard line with our so-called hosts to<br />

ensure the security of the U.S. servicemen at Khobar. Both the military and civilian<br />

leadership seemed to me more concerned with not offending the Saudis than they<br />

were with the safety of our people.<br />

Ultimately, the Iranian-backed Hezbollah al-Hejaz (Party of God) was found<br />

responsible for the attacks. Thirteen Saudi nationals and one Lebanese man were<br />

indicted by the U.S. District Court of Eastern Virginia, but there has been no justice<br />

to date. These terrorists remain on the FBI’s Most Wanted list.<br />

Although Schwalier was eventually cleared and his actions found not to be<br />

culpable for the attacks, my opinion of him remains unchanged. Doing everything<br />

possible to protect your people is a fundamental command principle. It can’t<br />

always be achieved, especially in combat, but a good leader would fall on his sword<br />

over conditions like this, and I don’t believe Schwalier made the necessary efforts.<br />

He didn’t make any waves in the interest of our security that I could see, and the<br />

result was nineteen dead Americans and hundreds more like me who live with their<br />

injuries every day. Remember, we’re not talking about a civilian company that<br />

makes computer chips or sells fast food. This is the front-line military, deployed on<br />

foreign soil. Not doing enough doesn’t damage a corporate bottom line—it gets<br />

people killed.<br />

More broadly, the Khobar bombing was a warning of just how ominously<br />

unprepared the military leadership was to face the post–Cold War security reality,<br />

where extremist groups can pose as much of a threat as state-sponsored fighters.<br />

(This new state of affairs would, in time, change everything—from training to<br />

weapon systems to tactics.) In August 1996, a month after the attack, Osama bin<br />

Laden issued a fatwa titled “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying<br />

the Land of the Two Holy Places,” referring to the U.S. military presence in Saudi<br />

Arabia (home of the Muslim holy sites Mecca and Medina). While bin Laden’s

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