PLENTIFUL ENERGY

EBR-II experience demonstrates that if the next sodium-cooled fast reactors are
designed thoughtfully, and as designs evolve further, sodium-cooled fast reactors
can have a very high level of reliability, maintainability, operability, and longevity.
The basic design approach must be a simple, forgiving design, avoiding complexity
and avoiding layers of safety systems, and made possible by its inherent safety
features.
Turning to the future prospects of fast reactors, some interest in fast reactors has
been seen in recent years around the world, following the hiatus of the past two or
three decades. In Russia, where BN-600 has been operating successfully over thirty
years, and the construction of BN-800, originally planned in the 1980s, but caught
up in the political maelstrom of the early ‗90s, was resumed a few years ago. It is
now scheduled to be on-line around 2014. The China Institute of Atomic Energy
(CIAE) has constructed the China Experimental Fast Reactor (CEFR), rated at 65
MWth, 20 MWe (the capacity of EBR-II), which achieved criticality in 2010 and
first power operation in 2011. China plans to construct two additional 800 MWe
fast reactors by 2020 in cooperation with Russia. In India the Fast Breeder Test
Reactor (FBTR) reached initial criticality in 1985 and has been operating
successfully, including demonstration of a full carbide-fueled core. India is now
building a 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR), with commissioning
targeted for 2014. Four more units of the same size are planned for completion by
2020. Two sites have been designated for twin units each. India may well be the
first nation in the world to establish a commercial fast reactor economy. Both
France and Japan envision commercial fast reactors starting in 20452050 and to
that end they plan prototype demonstration projects in the 20202025 time frame.
South Korea is also developing a prototype sodium-cooled fast reactor toward the
construction by 2028. [18-19]
14.8 Typical Deployment Scenarios
It is important to understand the effects of IFR deployments. To give an idea of
its effect, we have considered deployment in the plausible nuclear growth scenario
depicted in Figure 14-10. The World Nuclear Association surveyed member
countries and compiled low and high estimates for nuclear capacity. [20] In 2030
the low is 552 GWe, the high case 1,203 GWe. In 2060, the low and high cases are
1,136 GWe and 3,488 GWe, and in 2100 they are 2,050 GWe and 11,000 GWe. In
Figure 14-10, we took an average of the low case and the high case. This is not a
forecast; our objective is to illustrate the limitations and impacts of a high IFR
deployment rate on uranium resources.
In Figure 14-10, nuclear expansion in the near term is assumed to be provided by
the license extension (to sixty years) of the existing reactors plus the 1,575 GWe of
new LWRs needed to meet the capacity assumed through 2050, taking into account
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