PLENTIFUL ENERGY

performance. But the decision had been made and it was final. EBR-II became the
last of its line.
The priority to development of the fast breeder reactor had begun with an
influential report to the president in 1962. The AEC then intended to use EBR-II,
the Fermi-1 reactor built by APDA for Detroit Edison, and the SEFOR reactor built
in Arkansas by GE, to establish reactor fuels and materials, safety properties, and
operating characteristics of a first generation of fast reactors. Argonne was
authorized to build a Fast Reactor Test Facility (FARET) on its Idaho site, as an
advanced facility for testing components.
EBR-II began operation in 1964 and was still operating in the mid-eighties when
IFR development was initiated. Its purpose and mission then had little to do with its
purpose when it was built. It was to be the pilot plant for a whole new technology.
The ―oxide revolution‖ had overtaken it. Not only the metal fuel, but the pool
configuration, and the on-site processing—all were abandoned. The national
direction had turned away from these Argonne selections. The new direction was to
be oxide fuel, ―loop‖ configuration (only the core inside the reactor vessel, the
coolant piped to heat exchangers outside the vessel), and centralized spent fuel
processing in a large standalone plant located somewhere else, not on-site. A
complete reversal of direction, really, for in addition to its technical rationale, the
dramatic change was driven by unusually significant changes in the personnel of the
Atomic Energy Commission and in the accompanying congressional support. These
developments had impacts on Argonne that shook the laboratory to its very core.
Impressed by the rapid development of the submarine reactor under Rickover‘s
single-minded direction, powerful elements of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy of both houses of Congress felt that progress on the breeder had been too
slow. Research, they said, had been preferred over a single-minded emphasis on
going ahead and building fast reactors. Construction was what was required. Led by
Milt Shaw from Rickover‘s staff in Washington, in late 1964 ex-Naval Reactors
personnel were put in charge of fast reactor development at the AEC.
Shaw modeled fast breeder development on Rickover‘s success with the
Shippingport reactor. [11] Shippingport was a 60 MWe PWR prototype for civil
power generation and for aircraft carrier propulsion. Its construction was directed
by the government. It began operation in 1957 and operated for about twenty-five
years. Applying this experience to the breeder development program meant
managing the breeder program as a construction project whose technology was a
settled issue. Detailed management from the AEC in Washington meant drastic
changes in management structure and national policies for breeder development.
One basic design variant of the breeder reactor was selected, and that decision was
frozen in place. There was to be no more explorative development. There would be
proof by testing of the components of the selected reactor type. It was made plain
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