PLENTIFUL ENERGY

sense primarily a commercial power producer, Argonne viewed the fraction of time
that EBR-II was at power as a useful gauge of performance but as secondary to the
needs of the program of R&D on this prototype. Shaw very much did not. He
demanded EBR-II be operated solely as a fuel irradiation device. Time at power
mattered. He pointed to Argonne‘s low numbers for time at power as proof of
incompetence, and demanded that changes be made in management. EBR-II already
had detailed day-to-day involvement of RDT people; no action related to reactor
startup or operation could be taken without the approval of Shaw‘s staff. (One onsite
representative had a gauge installed in his office so he could monitor the power
level without moving.) Humorous now, an RDT phrase of the time was ―malicious
compliance,‖ a bureaucratic stifling applied when in some area or other the
Laboratory had complied to the letter with RDT commands but the result had
worked out badly.
The development work spread around the national laboratory system and among
several private companies was driven by artificial deadlines. Arbitrary dates for
breeder introduction were introduced as though there were some externally imposed
imperative for construction, and then they were reset. Experience with and
knowledge of fast reactors, of course, had been pretty much confined to Argonne
among the national labs. But Shaw‘s stated purpose was to build a very large
industrial and institutional base to build fast reactors in quantity. This would be
done by instituting a very large and very costly program of proof testing of
individual elements of the reactor, not only at the laboratories, but at commercial
firms too, directed by Shaw‘s RDT in Washington. Ignored was the evidence,
obvious from LWR development and deployment, that when U.S. commercial firms
decide a technology is ready for deployment and there is demand, they go ahead
and deploy it, without ceremony. The sole real question was whether the breeder
technology Shaw selected was the right technology. It wasn‘t that some large
industrial base had to be built at this stage of breeder development. LWR
experience had shown that commercial incentive, implementing sound technology
based on experimental work, and follow-on development where necessary by
laboratories skilled at just that, would build an industrial base.
The switch to oxide fuel wasn‘t really any issue at Argonne. In several internal
meetings related to this at that time, it was clear that Argonne technical leaders saw
sense in this and accepted its likely usefulness for the fast reactor without any
particular reservation. ―Worth trying‖ seemed to be the view, but the rigidly
enforced direction that was to come wasn‘t foreseen. In fact, the amused look on the
face of the experienced leader of one meeting I attended at this time, when it was
suggested that metal should continue to be the basic fuel, told the story. Oxide
seemed to have proven itself as a reactor fuel, it was worth trying it in a sodiumcooled
system, and the AEC wanted to pursue it. With an indulgent chuckle he went
on with the oxide discussion.
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