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374 Araba Sey and Manuel Castellssupporters. The campaign website linked to one official and several unofficialblogs, daily discussion forums where Internet users and campaign staff couldshare ideas. The blog was not only “a constant conversation betweencampaign headquarters and Dean loyalists” (NPR, 2003), but also, “peer-topeerpolitics – voters connecting to other voters – without the middleman ofofficial campaign sanction” (Slate, 2003). At least three other candidates hadblogs. None generated as much attention as Dean’s, apparently because Dean’sblog community was allowed to function without campaign interference(Lessig, 2003). An example of how this facility promoted autonomy can beseen in a posting where one supporter asked for advice on how to respond topossible arguments against Dean (open thread posting by Cat.M, August 31,2003). Rather than refer Cat.M to the official campaign, respondents eithergave their own opinion or suggested other unofficial sources. Indeed, the officialcampaign dealt with the overflow of enquiries by encouraging people tovisit the blog for answers from other users.In addition to effective use of the Internet, the energy of Dean’s campaigncould be attributed to his charismatic and rebellious characteristics (PioneerPress, 2003). The Internet has been shown to have the greatest impact withanti-establishment candidates (Kamarck, 2002) and Dean’s blatant anti-warstance endeared him to like-minded Americans, especially middle-class maleyouth, who are precisely those that dominate the Internet and online politics(Coleman and Hall, 2001; Clough, 2003; Pew Internet and American LifeProject, 2003; Ward et al., 2003). Apart from having grown up with theInternet as their primary information source, this group is also more likely tobe seeking autonomous avenues for political participation, making the Internetan appropriate tool to reach them with targeted messages.Whether the Dean campaign knowingly capitalized on this characteristic ofthe Internet audience is arguable. Some commentators have suggested that thecampaign was heavily Internet focused because Dean could not afford to userelatively expensive traditional campaign strategies (CBS News, 2003) andhad nothing to lose by venturing into the unknown (Bolton, 2003).Nevertheless, this strategy proved effective for Dean, and his campaign’s willingnessto cede control to the electorate, in order to reap the benefits ofInternet politics, stood in stark contrast to the other Democratic campaigns.Of course, the innovative Dean campaign, which epitomized a new kind ofnetworked politics, could not necessarily amount to a formula for success inthe presidential election. Indeed, by the time you are reading our analysis, youwill know the results of the 2004 election. Our feeling, in November 2003, isthat there are too many factors influencing the presidential election outside thedynamics of the campaign itself, not the least being the politics of fear onwhich the Bush administration has based its influence over an American societystill traumatized by the attacks of September 11, 2001, and ready to give