Proceedings of the Workshop - United Nations Office for Outer ...

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122 EXPANDING GLOBAL REMOTE SENSING SERVICESexempted.189 Depending on the level of secrecy desired,this could limit the effectiveness of commercialsatellites for reconnaissance purposes.While JV2010 has been accepted at the Departmentof Defense level, Space Control has yet to be-it is farfrom clear whether Space Control is a workable defensedoctrine. Major factors that call its viability intoquestion are "key policies, agreements, and treaties".190Remote sensing raises issues regarding antisatelliteactivities. Officially accepting responsibility forprotecting nonmilitary satellites means being confidentthat, in the event one is attacked, an in-kind response ispossible which, in turn, involves the intricate, decadeslongpolitical and legal problems surrounding the use ofantisatellite measures.191 Other factors that call theviability of Space Control into question are economic.Officially accepting responsibility for protectingnonmilitary assets also means establishing expensiveoperational assets which would place fiscal constraintson other defense priorities.The rationale for Space Control is the increasingdependency of the United States and its allies on spaceassets for commerce and national security and theexpectation that they will continue to become moreinterrelated in the future.192 "Information dominance" isthe operational concept that will, in this view, ensuresecurity in the information age space environment.193The turbulent results of the temporary failure of the189 Gabrynowicz, supra note 89.190U.S. Space Command, Director of Plans, Peterson AFB,CO., Long Range Plan, Chapter 11. Downloadable andavailable athttp://www.spacecom.af.mil/usspace/LRP/ch11.htm191 Christol, Carl Q., The Role o f Law in United Stales - SovietAnns Control and Disarmament Relations, 21 The InternationalLawyer at 519 - 560, (1987).192 U.S. Space Command, Director of Plans, Peterson AFB,CO., Long Range Plan, Chapter 5.Downloadable and availableat http://www.spaceconm.af.mil/usspacc/LRP/toc.htm.193U.S. Space Command, Director of Plans, Peterson AFB,CO., Long Range Plan, Chapter 5, at 1. Downloadable andavailable athttp://www.spacecom.af.mil/usspace/LRP/ch05a.htmGalaxy IV commercial communications satellite, inMay, 1998, have been referred to as a minor exampleof the kind of chaos that can occur with the loss of aspace asset. This is the kind of crisis which SpaceControl concepts are intended to prevent and which isadvanced as the justification for the kind of strategy itrequires. However, space has been an exclusivelyweapons-free, peaceful, legal, political and operationalenvironment for decades. This is, in very large part, dueto the rule of law and diplomatic measures which wereimplemented as practical avenues to preventing hostilespace activities. Risking this stable environment withprovocative doctrines ought not be undertaken lightly.And with "no peer competitor on the horizon forAmerican military power,"194 the post-Cold War erapresents an opportunity to reinforce law and diplomacyat a time of reduced space threats.When the use of private systems are used either asa justification for, or as an implement of, Space Controlthen issues regarding openness and the expansion ofglobal remote sensing services arise. Where publicprivateseparation is a value using the private sector toprovide available services rather than using governmentcapabilities, is an expansion of space-based services.The national security community is already looking toprivate services to provide and enhance theircapabilities.195 However, considering that thecommercial viability of remote sensing has also beenlinked to defense needs by the economic reality thatcommercial systems are unlikely to survive without thegovernment as a reliable, long-term customer,196another interpretation is possible. This situation may becreating a self-reinforcing post-Cold War militaryindustryrelationship that is giving rise to a nascentmilitary-informational complex analogous to themilitary-industrial complex of the Cold War. If this isthe case, then openness, as an operating principle, may194 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The MilitaryBalance 1997-1998, (1998).195 Space News, U.S. To Buy Private Imagery fo r Intelligence,April 12, 1999, at 1, col. 1.196 Defense Information and Electronics Report, Experts: DoDNeeds To Back Commercial Imagery Efforts to Reap Benefits,May 7, 1999 at 1.
EXPANDING GLOBAL REMOTE SENSING SERVICES 123be at risk and if the commercial satellites evolve into anextension of military functions more than as a service tothe general market, then the expansion of ground-baseddata and information services may be restricted.Yet, in attempting to define new missions in thepost-Cold War era, even previously highly-classifiednational security institutions are moving toward levelsof openness that were once inconceivable.197 It may alsobe that to justify their missions in the information age,maintaining a level of accessibility and visibility thatwas once unnecessary will become a practicalrequirement and will lead to an unprecedented era ofopenness. Time will tell. Finally, while this particulardiscussion is about emerging United States issues, itmust be noted that other countries are involved in SpaceControl-like policies198 and similar matters,199 makingconcepts like these of a more global interest.Establishing and maintaining long-term,coherent regional and global remotesensing data archivesLike the Cold War human spaceflight programs, theearly political rationale for remote sensing was todemonstrate technological superiority of theparticipating nations. This meant that the primary focuswas on the space segment where satellites displayedtechnical sophistication overhead. Satellites, likespacecraft that carried humans, became symbols ofnational preeminence and remote sensing nationsoffered data as an incentive for aligning with them.200And, to a large degree, it worked. This space-segmentfocus meant, however, that attention to the satellites'product, data, was virtually nonexistent. As a result, along-term, coherent regional and global approach to thearchiving of remotely sensed data has yet to beestablished. Data from numerous satellites haslanguished in uncoordinated, fractured repositories innations around the world.While enormous progress has been made indesigning, developing and operating remote sensingsatellites, an analogous effort for the ground segmenthas only recently begun. Some nations did, relativelyearly, recognize that their strength would be in theground segment and placed their national efforts ondeveloping it.201 However, it was not until this decadethe economic value of data has been recognized in boththe public and private sectors and has become theprimary driver for data-oriented organizational efforts.The emerging approaches are occurring quickly with astrong emphasis on intellectual property rights and dataprotection. Where the necessary focus is on relativelyshort-term interests like cost-sharing of publicly-fundedsatellites or generating revenue from private satellites,this is to be expected.However, data, unlike the wealth-generatingphysical products of the industrial age are not depletedwhen sold or distributed and can be combined withother data to make entirely new, also nondepletable,products. In many cases, data values shift fromeconomic to scientific over time.202 Therefore legal197 Consider, for example, the educational outreach role of thepreviously highly-classified National Reconnaissance Officehttp://www.nro.odci.gov/index.html and the on-line commercialinformation of the National Imagery Agency, formerly theDefense Mapping Agency. http./ / 164.214.2.59/nimahome.html198 Ha'aretz, supra note 17.199 Reuters, U.S.-Israel Satellite-Imaging Firm Plans BondIssue, Tel Aviv, Israel, February 28, 1999. Regarding aproposed commercial Israeli system, it was reported that,"governments [are expected] to be attracted to[ it] because itwas less expensive than developing their own militarysurveillance program, which could cost five to 10 times asmuch."200 For example, since 1975, nations receiving Landsat datawere required to participate in the Landsat Ground StationOperations Working Group (LGSWOG). Although still inexistence, it has yet to function as a true global network.201 1984 House of Lords Select Committee Report on RemoteSensing and Digital Mapping.202 This fact is demonstrated by the contract terms betweenNASA and Orbimage for the Orb-View2 satellite, also knownas SeaStar with the Sea-viewing Wide Field-of-view Sensor(SeaWiFS). In this contract, the Government procures spacebasedenvironmental remote sensing data for research purposesfrom a commercial operator. Researchers can receive data freelybut only after the data is at least two weeks old, when the initialcommercial value of the data has declined.
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ST/SPACE/2Office for Outer Space Af
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IntroductionThe Workshop on Space L
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CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS OF THEWOR
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3between public and private law and
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8obstacles that impede ratification
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SESSION ONEExisting United Nations
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EXISTING UNITED NATIONS TREATIES: S
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48low earth orbit. This commercial
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SESSION EIGHTMaintaining the Space
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MAINTAINING THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT 1
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220Session 3: Wednesday. 21 July. 1
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223Annex IITHIRD UNITED NATIONS CON
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225No Name Address E-Mail27. Ersfel
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227No Name Address E-Mail57. Koloso
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231No Name Address E-Mail117. Steph
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