Proceedings of the Workshop - United Nations Office for Outer ...

92 EXPANDING GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES(B) The States that objected to Tonga’s notification toITU have secured radio frequencies and geostationaryorbital positions for their private entities to provideinternational services. These entities have been and arebeing encouraged to secure foreign financialparticipation. Pursuant to the WTO initiatives forforeign investment and globalization of businessoperations, such entities could be/would be foreignowned and controlled to a large extent, and in somecase even 100%. In my opinion, they are and would bedoing exactly what Tonga did; i.e. using radiofrequencies notified and registered by one State andused and exploited by the companies of the other(s).In my opinion, the Tongasat case has been morepsychological problem than a real one. The States thatobjected to Tonga’s request for geostationary orbitalpositions, I think, were surprised to see how a smallState could “out smart” them. Thus they have putunfair pressure on Tonga. Such pressure has neverbeen imposed on any other State in any previous case.I believe that the most important achievement ofTongasat issue has been that it showed clearly theweakness of the first-come first-served rule that hasbeen strongly guarded by the States that objected toTonga.Prof. Lyall proposes to relate ’’voting weight tofinancial contribution” to ITU. In my opinion, thisproposal is impractical in law for the following reasons:(A) I do not think that the international community isyet ready to do away with the most fundamentalprinciple of international law; i.e. equality of States. (B)We have seen, in some cases like INTELSAT andINMARSAT, that States appear to have accepted someexceptions/restrictions to their sovereign equality butthat has happened only at the level of their operatingagencies and more importantly when States or theircompanies are receiving something in return. I see noreason why a large majority of States will do away withthe rule of one-state one-vote in ITU. (C) Moreimportantly, in practice, 10% of the States thatcontribute to the 90% of ITU budget (if one acceptsProf. Lyall's figures) actually get 95 to 100% of thepie. What I am saying is that those who contribute alion’s share actually get lion’s share of the pie too. Thebest proof of this is the results of WorldRadiocommunication Conferences (WRC) that allocateradio frequencies to various services. It is almostimpossible to have any proposal accepted by a WRC ifthat is not fully supported by a small minority of States(i.e. the major contributors to the ITU’s budget).Secondly, fairly a large majority of the States has beenpressing for a change of the first-come first-served rulefor decades. What they got was a priori plans only fortwo services (BSS and FSS) in two frequency bands(12 GHz and 6/4 plus 14/11 GHz) mainly because ofthe strong opposition by this small minority of States.Therefore, what Prof. Lyall is proposing is actuallybeing practiced, but one should not yet expect its dejure acceptance by the international community.I agree with the following two points raised byProf. Lyall and would like to repeat them in order tohighlight their importance. They deal with (A) thesource utilization fee; and (B) the creation of aninternational regulatory body.Since 1983, 1 have been proposing the imposition of afee for resource utilization and I am glad to see thatfinally in 1998 the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference hasagreed to impose such a fee. I believe that it will, tosome extent, solve the problems of “paper satellites”and of inefficient resource allocation.I also agree with Prof. Lyall's proposal for thecreation of an international regulatory body - which inmy opinion should be charged with, inter alia, theresponsibility of achieving the goals set in UNGAResolution 1721, as amended; though I am not surewhether the US Federal Communications Commission,as suggested by Prof. Lyall, is a good model for such abody, but this is a matter of details. The ITU confinesitself to technical issues of resource allocation andtechnical standards. The WTO, on the other hand, isoverwhelmed with all issues of international trade ingoods and services but has almost nothing to do withglobal (as opposed to national) public good as far astelecommunications are concerned. Therefore, theWTO can not be expected to implement the principle ofUNGA Resolution 1721.However, on the one hand Prof. Lyall proposes theweighted vote procedure for ITU and on the other handhe suggests that ITU could be an internationalregulation body. In my opinion, these two proposals are