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42 EXPANDING GLOBAL LAUNCH SERVICESenvisaged time, in respect of cost, reliability andmission suitability.”Additionally, the States participating in the Arianeproject, in the same year made a commitment on thepreferential use of the Ariane launch vehicle similar tothe above treaty provision, both in respect of ESAactivities and of national space activities, and promisedto support such use in the framework of theinternational programmes in which they participated.The U.S. Federal departments and agencies abideby a Presidental policy of 1990, confirmed at lateroccasions, that“U.S. government satellites will be launched on U.S.manufactured launch vehicles unless specificallyexempted by the President.”The Commercial Space Act of 1998, dealing, interalia, with the same ‘fly U.S.’ subject, does not use thecountry of manufacture of the launcher as a criterion,but the nationality of the launch provider:“Except as otherwise provided in this section, theFederal Government shall acquire space transportationservices from United States commercial providerswhenever such services are required in the course of itsactivities. To the maximum extent practicable, theFederal Government shall plan missions to accomodatethe space transportation capabilities of United Statescommercial providers.”12Though the purpose of the above U.S. andEuropean provisions is basically the same, there areinteresting differences in practice and in practicaleffects.• Traditionally, the U.S. government market hasbeen considerably larger, in number of12 See Commercial Space Act of 1998, P.L. 105-303 (HR 1702),Title II - Federal acquisition of space transportation services,Sec.201-206. A U.S. commercial provider is defined as “acommercial provider, organized under the laws of the UnitedStates or of a State, which is (A) more than 50 percent ownedby United States nationals; or (B) a subsidiary of a foreigncompany..”, with category (B) subject to a number of specificstringent criteria.launches and value, than the European marketof ESA and national member statesgovernment launches. (Only the Russianmarket of civilian and military launches cameanywhere near the U.S. total). Data from theabove FAA Report show the following figuresfor 1998:CommercialNoncommercialU.S 17 19 36Russia 5 19 24Europe 9 2 11China 4 2 6Totallaunches• Neither ESA nor the individual ESA memberstates or the Ariane participants havescrupulously adhered to the ‘Ariane preference’commitments. In practice, ESA madeexceptions to the rule when faced withoperational or financial difficulties.Additionally, some member states feel free touse the cost level of the Ariane, compared to itscompetitors’, or the (semi-)privatized status ofits telecom agency as an argument for choosinga competing foreign launch provider. Andregional European space organizations likeEutelsat and Eumetsat felt some commitmentbut no obligation to use the Ariane.By contrast, the U.S. government agencies so farhave felt obliged, by law and policy, to use domesticlaunch vehicles and launch providers, and have actedaccordingly. An additional factor supporting the U.S.firmness in this respect is the availability of alternativedomestic launch providers: in addition to the SpaceShuttle and the Air Force- operated Titan, two privatecompanies, Boeing and Lockheed Martin, may help out;and for LEO launches and smaller payloads, a thirdprivate company, Orbital Sciences Corporation,provides the Pegasus and Taurus launchers.The overall effect of the above regulations andpractices, based on a combination of national security
EXPANDING GLOBAL LAUNCH SERVICES 43and competitive considerations, is that a sizeable part ofthe total global launch market is not open tointernational competition, to the disadvantage, ofcourse, of the excluded launch providers, but in the endalso of both the respective governments and the privatecustomers.Effects of the present regulatoryenvironment on the globalprovision of launch servicesIn the foregoing, a few observations on the abovesubject have already been made. We will limit ourselveshere to a brief review of some additional examplesinvolving cooperation and competition between thevarious launch companies. Cooperation between launchproviders of different nationality has so far beenlimited. A few examples of such arrangements:Lockheed Martin and the Russian manufacturers ofthe Proton launcher, Khrunichev and Energia, jointlymarket the Proton through a U.S.-based firmInternational Launch Services (ILS). This arrangementhas had considerable advantages for both parties.Lockheed Martin added a reliable heavy-lift launcher toits Atlas and Titan launch vehicles, positioning itselfstrongly in the international market. The Russianlaunch firms not only got American international salesexperience to work for them but also the interest of thelatter in - and the ensuing domestic lobbying effortsfor - having the restrictions of the U.S.-Russian launchtrade agreement lifted or at least further liberalized.Boeing in the mean time took over McDonnellDouglas (MDD) and thus became a launch providerwith MDD’s successful medium-lift Delta launchfamily. To also enter the heavy-lift launch vehiclemarket, Boeing concluded an agreement with a Russian,Ukrainian and Norwegian firm to launch the UkrainianbuiltZenit from a movable platform in the PacificOcean. This project, Sea Launch, has already receivedthe support through a bulk launch order from Hughes,and is at the time of writing close to its first commerciallaunch.Both arrangements involve an American companyselling foreign launch vehicles, which is rather neutralfrom a U.S. missile/launcher export control point ofview. However, both U.S. companies have a clearinterest in guaranteeing, both vis-a-vis the insurers andthe customers, the reliability of the launch vehiclesoffered. That potentially raises transfer (“export”) ofsensitive U.S. know-how concerns on the part of theU.S. government, and entails State Department controlson all discussions between the partners which couldamount to such transfers. The ‘China affair’ has led toincreased awareness and sharper controls, delaying theprogress of the cooperation and the furtherliberalization of the applicable launch trade agreements.Since a few years, Israel has been offering its -partially successful- Shavit launch vehicle to the U.S.for the launch of government payloads. At the sametime, to overcome the handicaps of a small, largelylandlocked territory to launch from, it requestedpermission to perform these launches from U.S. launchfacilities. (The U.S. government, true to its nonproliferationand export control policies, had for yearsdelayed, but not been able to prevent, the developmentof this new launch vehicle). Recently, however, the U.S.Coleman Research Corporation has been able to builda Shavit-based launch vehicle with sufficient U.S.content to qualify, under the above fly U.S. policy, asa U.S. launch vehicle which can be used for the launchof government payloads. Coleman has in the mean timebeen selected, together with Orbital SciencesCorporation, to perform launches for NASA.13Brazil's development of an indigenous smallsatellite launch vehicle (VLS-1) started in the early1980's, for the purpose of having independent access tospace, a consideration that also underlay Europe’sdecision to build the Ariane. The construction of theVLS-1 was impeded, through the years, by MTCRbasednational controls complied with by both U.S. andl3The LK-0 launcher is being developed in the U.S. jointly byColeman Research and Israel Aircraft Industries; it has notflown yet, but the Shavit has been launched four times with onefailure. The NASA program concerned involves 16 future smallpayload launches valued at USD 400 million, see Space News(Nov 2, 1998) at 1 (‘P egasus, Shavit win big, but NASA shunsAthena”).
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A resource management/administratio
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SESSION FOURExpanding Global Remote
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SESSION EIGHTMaintaining the Space
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220Session 3: Wednesday. 21 July. 1
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223Annex IITHIRD UNITED NATIONS CON
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