Proceedings of the Workshop - United Nations Office for Outer ...

82 EXPANDING GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICESupgraded to a “Constitution” (CS) like since longin the other UN Specialized Agencies,supplemented by a “Convention” (CV). Withregard to “The ITU and Development” (see page72), it must not be forgotten that the ITU hadalready since the late 1960's in its GS a ‘TechnicalCooperation Department” providing technicalassistance in the telecom field to developingcountries and participating closely in the executionof UNDP programs and projects. This Departmentand its activities became already upgraded to the‘Telecommunications Development Bureau(BDT)” in 1989 at Nice and thus put on the samelevel as the traditional “permanent organs”, i.e. theGS, IFRB, CCIR and CCIT T: an action which hadindeed to be taken politically vis-a-vis thedeveloping countries! It was, therefore, only logicalthat the 1992 reorganization of the ITU resulted inthe three Sectors, known as ITU-R (radio), ITU-T(standardization) and ITU-D (development) withtheir respective bureaus and elected directors. Itmust equally not be overlooked that technical aid,assistance and co-operation in the telecom field canbest be provided by the ITU itself and not throughother general, development agencies. This is - bythe way - in the best interest of both the developingcountries and the industrialized ones, for whichthus interesting markets are open. In this respect, Ientirely disagree with Frank Lyall’s conclusionsand hold that it has “been wise” to include thewhole development of technical assistance and cooperationin telecom matters in the realm of theITU and not elsewhere.6. With regard to the “Radio Regulations Board”(RRB) (see page 72), practical experience in theITU-R since Kyoto 1994 has amply demonstrated,as all ITU insiders will confirm, that “a full-timeBoard would” not “be better”, and that a part-timeBoard is not only quite sufficient ( and much lesscostly!), but should also be maintained and not beabolished, as certain radio circles still had intendedand expected before and in 1994; by the way, therecent increase in 1998 from nine to twelvemembers is exclusively due to considerations of“equitable geographical distribution amongst theregions of the world” (CS No. 62 ). Whilesomehow sharing Lyall’s “fears as to impartiality”,I must admit that since 1994 not one single incidenthas become known, which would justify this fear.Furthermore, the qualification requirements for,and other provisions concerning, the RRBmembers, which “shall serve ... as custodians of aninternational public trust”, have remained insubstance the same as they had been for themembers of the old IFRB (cf. the provision in CSArticle 14 and CV Article 10).7. In the Section on “Voting rights and Finance” itis - somewhat misleading and certainly completelyunintentionally - stated that “90% of themembership pays 10% of the general costs of theUnion”. According to the detailed figures justobtained from the ITU’s Finance Department, forthe purposes of the present comments, the realfigures for the ITU membership and their bearingthe costs of the ITU Budget are as follows: 10%bear 75%; 15% bear 80%,and 25% bear 90%, sothat it may only be held that - in the worst case ofcalculation! - “75% of the membership” - andcertainly not “90%”! - “pay 10%” of the Union’sbudget! Without denying “a disparity betweenvoting weight and financial weight”, which, at anyrate exists in all organizations of the UN System, Ican simply not follow Lyall in his conclusion that“such a disparity is wrong, not to say grotesque”,as I consider it dangerous to add in this context“the imbalance among states of practicalcompetence in telecommunications”. Seriouslyinvoking the latter argument could indeed become“a potential threat to the proper and satisfactoryfunctioning of the Union”. No steps “to restore”any such disparity or imbalance should be taken,e.g. by - as Lyall envisages - relating “votingweight to financial contribution, and perhaps totelecommunications usage both within and from/toa Member”. The maintenance of the principle of“freedom of choice of the contributory unit” hasbeen reconfirmed again at Minneapolis in 1998,and with good reasons. The Union will have welland “sprightly” survived with that traditionalformula, on 17 May 2000, for 135 years and hasremained “one of the success stories ofinternational co-operation”, to use Lyall’s ownterms. It is, in my considered opinion, quitepreferable to stick in this respect to the Union’s