Proceedings of the Workshop - United Nations Office for Outer ...

EXPANDING GLOBAL LAUNCH SERVICES 55They have specific mandates entrusted to them whichare essential to the conduct of efficient and economicalspace activities. INTELSAT and to a certain extent theITU and ICAO also must deal with launch services(and the return of space objects ). Beyond that, thevery character of launch vehicles and the absolutenecessity, given present global circumstances, to controlthe proliferation of launch vehicle technology and data,places the control of launch services within the nationalsecurity umbrella of those states possessing suchtechnology and data. As regards the use of thesevehicles in furtherance of the goals expressed inArticle I of the Outer Space Treaty, the United Statesthrough NASA, whose charter includes the mandate tofurther international space cooperation, has entered intonumerous cooperative arrangements with othercountries, including non-launching countries, by whichthe latter share not only in the scientific data derivedfrom the payloads but also in many cases theresponsibility for producing various payload modulesand instrumentation. Other countries possessing launchcapabilities have done likewise. While there may alwaysbe room for improvement in such cooperativeundertakings, the fact remains that under currentgeopolitical circumstances, it is unlikely that nationswill cede control of their launch technology such as toan IGO established to provide launch services.Launch services and the WTOWhile none of the three countries with which the UnitedStates required launch services trade agreements is amember of WTO, the primary reason, I believe, that theU.S. insisted on the exception in the GATS and in theGovernment Procurement Agreement was to preservethe market for launch of U.S. government payloads forthe benefit of U.S. commercial launch providers to theexclusion of foreign providers. As noted, supra,President Bush’s September 1990 executive orderpreceded by several years the conclusion of theUruguay Round. I have always viewed this“protection” coupled with the requirement of tradeagreements in the case of China, Russia and theUkraine, as the U.S. Government’s “ace” in responseto what it has consistently maintained is subsidizationby foreign governments of their national launchproviders. Further, I would note that the GATT-94,which incorporates the provisions of the GATT 1947,includes the latter’s specific exception in the case of the“essential security interests” of a contracting party.Recommendations1. As concerns the provision of launch services, weneed to accept the fact that under the present globalcircumstances, the licensing of launch technology willremain tightly controlled. However, this does not meanthat full advantage cannot be continue to be made of“partnering relationships” between launching and nonlaunchingcountries. COPUOS should continue to workto encourage the furtherance of such arrangements.2. As for the issue of implementation in municipal lawof a state’s international treaty obligations with respectto outer space, COPUOS should establish and maintaina compilation of the various national laws in thisrespect. This would provide a ready reference to statesparty to Outer Space Treaty which wish to develop orexpand their national laws in fulfillment of their ArticleVI obligations as parties.3. COPUOS should use its good offices in ways thatcan help to bring about appropriate and harmoniousinternational and national laws with respect to theregistration of security interests for the protection ofcreditors’ rights in orbiting space objects and theircomponent, e.g., transponders.Commentary PaperJose Monserrat Filho27First of all, let me thank the coordination of thisWorkshop for the kind invitation to comment on27 Vice-President of the Brazilian Society of Aerospace Law(SBDA) and member of the Board of the International Instituteof Space Law (IISL). Visiting professor of Space Law at the Riode Janeiro University (UNI-RIO).