13. Social Engineering and Phishingare no longer effective. Therefore, the malware authors must resort to socialengineering-basedtechniques for persuading victims to install legitimatelookingapplications that hide malicious functionalities.13.2 Who Is Going to Be Affected?Most Internet users have come across cases of social engineering, such asin cases of spam emails originating from friends’ email addresses [365] thathave been compromised. In other cases, the emails originate from differentaddresses and just masquerade as having been sent by a friend. In bothcases, the attackers goal is to exploit the implicit trust users show towardcommunication from their online contacts.Nowadays, with the seemingly universal adoption of online social networks,and the abundance of personal information released, users are unwillinglyand unknowingly aiding attackers in launching social engineering attacks.Thus, users of such social services are bound to become the main target ofpersonalized spam campaigns, that incorporate user information in order toappear more convincing.Furthermore, the explosive increase of mobile devices with Internet connectivity(i.e., smartphones) is slowly shifting the focus of malware authors tothese devices. Smartphones combine telephone devices capable of “dialing-in”(i.e., have a built-in billing system), with a sophisticated environment capableof executing arbitrary code and, at the same time, offer a full-featu<strong>red</strong> browseraccess to the Internet. Therefore, smartphones present a large attack surface astheir users visit arbitrary sites on the web.Attacks against high-value assets have been seen and are expected tobecome even more prominent, as activists resort to digital media for furtheringpolitical schemes [269], protesting against lawmaking and opposing oppressiveregimes [84].Chapter 6 of the SysSec Deliverable D7.1: Review of the State-of-the-Art inCyberattacks [373] discusses the state of the art in social-network- and socialengineering-basedattacks.13.3 What Is Expected to Happen?While the typical phishing activities via email and online social networkswill continue to affect Internet users, social engineering is also expected toincrease in various areas (most notably, by targeting mobile devices), and in itssophistication and scale (e.g., thanks to automation techniques).Regarding mobile devices, as detailed in Chapter 8, Android’s securitydesign enforces that each installed application must run with a distinct useraccount. As a consequence, each application process has its own, isolated(virtual) memory space. Albeit simple, this security mechanism prevents a94
13.3. What Is Expected to Happen?(vulnerable) application (e.g., a browser) running within a certain processspace, from being exploited to execute malicious code. In this security model,the role of social engineering and phishing becomes paramount, because theattacker model changes completely: the attacker is able to compromise a deviceonly by managing to have a malicious application executed with the correctprivileges. In the last 2 years, we have indeed witnessed numerous cases ofmobile malware campaigns (see also Chapter 8), in which users were fooledusing classic social-engineering techniques (e.g., email attachments, maliciousapplications disguised as legitimate software through official and unofficialmarketplaces). In this evolving computing landscape, where powerful, expensivehosts sha<strong>red</strong> by many users are giving way to powerful, inexpensivedevices owned by a single user, we expect that social engineering techniqueswill be utilized more than in the past.Given the prevalence of portable computers and mobile phones, the offendershave also been exploiting the voice channel in phishing campaigns.Although classic, this luring scheme has recently been gaining more attention[135, 264, 266]. Typically, the phishers contact their victims, via live telephonecalls, automated responders, or SMS [148], and attempt to trick theminto revealing sensitive information, performing some action (e.g., to unlockor repair their computers), or placing a payment for some expi<strong>red</strong> (bogus)insurance. Albeit simple, this attack scheme is effective where other means fail:indeed, a live conversation enhances the effectiveness of social engineeringtechniques significantly. This does not happen normally with e-mailing becausethe e-mails have to be read, which decreases the chances of the attackerssuccessfully luring the victims. A recent study also noticed a variation ofthis scheme, which is arguably more effective, where victims are lu<strong>red</strong> intocontacting the phishers through telephone numbers spread via social network’smessaging systems (e.g., Twitter [164]).Another interesting, yet dangerous, expected scenario is the significantspread of attacks that affect mobile payment and banking systems. In thesesystems, the mobile device, and thus its owner, becomes a much more sensitivetarget than in the classic PC-based banking operations. First, the usabilityof mobile apps guarantees a larger user base of payment systems. Second,trojans were among the first type of malicious software to be ported to mobileplatforms, including ZitMo and SpitMo [120] (i.e., variants of ZeuS and SpyEyefor Android). Notably, this scenario also creates complex attack venues suchas the case were mobile devices are used as authorization tokens for financialtransactions initiated from, for instance, a traditional web application.In conclusion, what we expect is a less steeply increasing trend in traditional,email-based phishing than in the past. Traditional phishing will arguablygive ground to heterogeneous (e.g., voice, social networks, SMS) phishingcampaigns where social engineering will play a significant role, also thanks95
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SEVENTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMMETHERED B
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The Red Book. ©2013 The SysSec Con
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PrefaceAfter the completion of its
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Contents1 Executive Summary 32 Intr
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1 Executive SummaryBased on publish
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1.2. Grand Challenges4. will have t
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2. Introductionwho want to get at t
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2. Introduction• Although conside
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2. Introductionfuture, where each a
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2. Introductiondrones), such sensor
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2. Introductioncover our energy nee
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Part I: Threats Identified
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3. In Search of Lost Anonymity3.2 W
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3. In Search of Lost Anonymityguide
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4 Software VulnerabilitiesExtending
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4.1. What Is the Problem?infrastruc
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4.5. State of the Artparts of criti
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4.7. Example Problemstem mitigation
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5. Social Networks5.1 Who Is Going
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5. Social Networksby such an applic
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5. Social Networksdisasters. This r
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6. Critical Infrastructure Security
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25 The Dutch National Cyber Securit
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25.1. ContextsInternet (e.g., smart
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25.1. Contextsdefensive approaches
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25.2. Research Themesand radio broa
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25.2. Research Themesconsists of se
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25.2. Research ThemesRisk managemen
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AMethodologiesIn this appendix we o
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BSysSec Threats Landscape Evolution
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B.4. SysSec 2013 Threats LandscapeT
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B.4. SysSec 2013 Threats LandscapeS
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Bibliography[1] 10 Questions for Ke
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Bibliography[45] SCADA & Security o
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Bibliography[88] A. Avizienis, J.-C
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Bibliography[130] G. Cluley. 600,00
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Bibliography[172] D. Evans. Top 25
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Bibliography[214] ICS-CERT. Monthly
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Bibliography[253] C. Lever, M. Anto
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Bibliography[291] Mozilla. Browseri
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