12. Malwarethan 128 million malware samples in their database [73]. Symantec reportsthat in 2012, one in 291 emails contained some form of malware [75].At the same time, the increasing professionalism of cyber criminals makesdefending against sophisticated malware increasingly hard. Once sophisticatedtricks of the most skilled virus authors, advanced evasion techniques like codeobfuscation, packing, and polymorphism are now the norm in most instancesof malicious code. Using polymorphism, the malware is mutated so that eachinstance acquires a unique byte pattern, thereby making signature extractionfor the whole breed infeasible. As the number of new vulnerabilities andmalware variants grows at a frantic pace, detection approaches based onthreat signatures, which are employed by most virus scanners and intrusiondetection systems, cannot cope with the vast number of new malicious codevariants [302].12.2 Who Is Going to Be Affected?Any computing device of sufficient capabilities can potentially be infectedby malware. Besides personal computers and servers, the traditional targetsof malware, mobile phones and tablets have recently started being plaguedby malicious applications. Indicatively, McAfee reports that the growth inthe number of mobile malware threats almost doubles every quarter, with95% of the total number of samples in their database arriving in 2012 [73].Computers and mobile devices, however, are not the only target. Malwarecan infect routers [141], phones [139], printers [140], gaming consoles [236],cars [123], and essentially any programmable computing device. As discussedin Chapter 6, industrial systems are often exposed to various threats, includingmalware infection, while malware managed to creep even into the InternationalSpace Station [64].12.3 What Is Expected to Happen?Practice has shown that malware authors continually try to devise new ways ofevading existing detection systems, improve the stealthiness of their maliciouscode, and expand their reach to as many systems as possible. This is evident inseveral recent trends, including the proliferation of signed malware, server-sidepolymorphism, and the significant increase in the number of malware samplesfor mobile devices and typically less-targeted operating systems, such as MacOS X [73].Malware that has been digitally signed using a trusted certificate is capableof infecting even systems with strict configurations that allow the installationof software only from trusted sources. In recent incidents, malware authorsmanaged to steal digital certificates from reputable software companies, whichthey then used to sign their malware binaries. Server-side polymorphism is88
12.4. What Is the Worst That Can Happen?another recent technique that malware authors employ to render signaturebasedantivirus protection ineffective. By dynamically generating a differentinstance of the malware binary at the server, each victim is infected by a uniqueversion of the malware that is unlikely to be encounte<strong>red</strong> in the future. Byhiding the logic of the polymorphic engine at the server, malware analystshave also a harder time identifying common patterns that could be used for detection.Other techniques used for hindering analysis and detection includinganti-debugging tricks, VM detection, dormant functionality trigge<strong>red</strong> by timeor other events, memory-resident code, and advanced code obfuscation andmetamorphism, are also expected to be used increasingly in future malwarestrands.12.4 What Is the Worst That Can Happen?Depending on the author’s intent, malware can potentially have devastatingconsequences. Typically, upon infection, malware attempts to steal everybit of private information from the victim’s device, including c<strong>red</strong>it cardnumbers, personal files, and access c<strong>red</strong>entials to web-banking, web-mail, orsocial networking websites. Infected computers also usually become “bots”in the attacker’s network of compromised hosts. The threat of such botnetsis extensively discussed in Chapter 11. Such networks of infected computersare essentially the infrastructure that allows cybercriminals to conduct a widerange of illegal activities, such as sending spam e-mails, launching denial ofservice attacks, hosting web sites for phishing, seeding malware, or publishingillegal material, and naturally, for probing and compromising other hosts.A worrisome prospect is the rise of ransomware [75], which encryptsimportant user documents or even locks the user’s computer completely. Torestore their files, users are asked to pay a ransom, in return for the decryptionkey. Depending on the malware’s sophistication and the type of encryptionused, cracking the encryption through other means can be infeasible. If themotive is not financial, catastrophic malware can irreversibly erase data (evenbackup files, if those are reachable through the same internal network), anddestroy crucial system components, such as the BIOS or other device firmware,causing severe damage.12.5 State of the ArtIn parallel with the development of cybercrime into a large undergroundeconomy driven by financial gain, malicious software has changed deeply.Originally, malicious software was mostly simple self-propagating code craftedprimarily in low-level languages and with limited code reuse. Today, malicioussoftware has turned into an industry that provides the tools that cybercriminalsuse to run their business [335]. Like legitimate software, malware is89
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SEVENTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMMETHERED B
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The Red Book. ©2013 The SysSec Con
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PrefaceAfter the completion of its
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Contents1 Executive Summary 32 Intr
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1 Executive SummaryBased on publish
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1.2. Grand Challenges4. will have t
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2. Introductionwho want to get at t
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2. Introduction• Although conside
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2. Introductionfuture, where each a
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2. Introductiondrones), such sensor
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2. Introductioncover our energy nee
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Part I: Threats Identified
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3. In Search of Lost Anonymity3.2 W
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3. In Search of Lost Anonymityguide
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4 Software VulnerabilitiesExtending
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4.1. What Is the Problem?infrastruc
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4.5. State of the Artparts of criti
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4.7. Example Problemstem mitigation
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5. Social Networks5.1 Who Is Going
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24 Cyber Security Strategy of theEu
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24.2. Strategic PrioritiesProposed
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25 The Dutch National Cyber Securit
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25.1. ContextsInternet (e.g., smart
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25.1. Contextsdefensive approaches
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25.2. Research Themesand radio broa
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25.2. Research Themesconsists of se
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25.2. Research ThemesRisk managemen
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AMethodologiesIn this appendix we o
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BSysSec Threats Landscape Evolution
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B.4. SysSec 2013 Threats LandscapeT
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B.4. SysSec 2013 Threats LandscapeS
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Bibliography[1] 10 Questions for Ke
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Bibliography[45] SCADA & Security o
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Bibliography[88] A. Avizienis, J.-C
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Bibliography[130] G. Cluley. 600,00
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Bibliography[172] D. Evans. Top 25
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Bibliography[214] ICS-CERT. Monthly
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Bibliography[253] C. Lever, M. Anto
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Bibliography[291] Mozilla. Browseri
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