4. Software Vulnerabilitiesinformation. Numerous security breaches in high-profile online services haveresulted in unauthorized access to whole databases with millions of entriesconsisting of usernames, passwords, financial information, and other privatedata [26, 50, 59, 61].4.2 Who Is Going to Be Affected?An ever increasing part of our business, social, and personal life involves onlineservices and software running on personal devices and equipment that weuse or depend on. Therefore, the risk of exploitable software vulnerabilitiescan affect all of us. Even people or organizations who do not engage inonline interactions or who even do not use any computing devices at all canbe affected, as software controls major parts of critical infrastructures. Forinstance, the massive outbreak of the Conficker worm at the beginning of 2009resulted in more than 10 million infected machines worldwide [319]. Amongthe millions of infected computers were machines in the Houses of Parliamentin London [286] and the Manchester City Council [254]. Just in the latter case,the infection cost an estimated £1.5 million in total. After a security breachat LinkedIn, a popular social networking service for people in professionaloccupations, the (weakly) encrypted passwords of more than 6.4 million userswere exposed [26].4.3 What Is Expected to Happen?Although decades of research and development insecure programming and software protections havematerialized in most of the widely used operatingsystems and applications, experience has shownthat the rate of discovery of software vulnerabilitieskeeps increasing. Given the professionalism anddetermination of criminals and other threat agents,and the ever increasing complexity and interdependenceof current software systems, it is expected that software vulnerabilitieswill not be eradicated anytime soon. At the same time, the increasing sophisticationof recent exploits [101, 304] is an indication that the detectionand mitigation of future threats will become harder as a result of the moreprevalent use of evasion techniques and stealthy attacks.4.4 What Is the Worst That Can Happen?Besides compromising the security and privacy of our digital interactions,software vulnerabilities can put at risk other parts of our daily activities, oreven our lives. In the same way a worm subverted industrial systems withinIran’s nuclear facilities [250], an extremist group could attempt to compromise30
4.5. State of the Artparts of critical infrastructures, such as power grids and traffic control systems,perhaps causing severe damage and potentially mass casualties. Threatsagainst critical infrastructures are further discussed in Chapter 6.Smaller-scale hostile acts could also be facilitated by the prevalence ofsoftware-controlled devices and equipment. Implantable medical devices [206]and cars [123] are two prominent examples.4.5 State of the ArtAfter decades of research and engineering aimed at dependable and securecomputing [88] with the broader aim of minimizing the undesirable effectsof software bugs, and consequently the potential threats stemming from theexploitation of software vulnerabilities, there is a vast amount of literature onthe subject [137,170,215,258,315,340,382]. In this section we briefly summarizedifferent broad areas of techniques that contribute towards lowering the risk ofsoftware vulnerabilities, especially in terms of their potential to be successfullyexploited. A more focused discussion of solutions directed against memorycorruption vulnerabilities is provided in Chapter 9.5.Numerous techniques seek to provide a proactive defense against futurethreats by eliminating or minimizing certain classes of vulnerabilities, orpreventing the manifestation of certain exploitation methods. Broad areasinclude programming language security features, code analysis techniques,confinement mechanisms, and diversification. Besides best security practicesand defensive programming, software hardening techniques include: staticsource code analysis for finding and eliminating certain classes of programmingflaws [387]; augmenting programs with runtime protections using compilerextensions [117, 136, 306], static binary instrumentation [297, 321], dynamicbinary instrumentation [125,235,299,325], or library interposition [96]; softwarefault isolation and sandboxing [196, 238]; and control flow integrity [76].At the operating system level, many different techniques aim to hinderthe exploitation of software vulnerabilities, including non-executablepages [151, 311], ASLR and code diversification [102, 102, 132, 183, 279, 308, 310],and instruction-set randomization [233, 233]. As additional protections usuallyincur significant runtime overhead, CPUs are constantly enhanced withsecurity features that facilitate the implementation of more lightweight solutions[184, 194, 245].In the field of web services and cloud-based applications, enhancementsand improvements in numerous system aspects, from the browser to the server,aim to improve the security of online interactions. Indicatively, different areasof focus include fundamental design choices of the web platform [98], specificshortcomings of browser implementations [97, 257], cross-site scripting(XSS) [201, 223, 293, 336, 345, 371], and more subtle complexities of web appli-31
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14 Grand ChallengesOne of the most
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Part II: Related Work
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15. A Crisis of Prioritization•
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16. Forwardare accessible from the
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17. Federal Plan for Cyber Security
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24 Cyber Security Strategy of theEu
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25 The Dutch National Cyber Securit
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25.1. ContextsInternet (e.g., smart
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Bibliography[1] 10 Questions for Ke
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Bibliography[45] SCADA & Security o
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Bibliography[88] A. Avizienis, J.-C
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Bibliography[130] G. Cluley. 600,00
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Bibliography[172] D. Evans. Top 25
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