5. Social Networksdisasters. This real-time information is expanding out of all proportion to ourability to process it. This is not just a data mining problem; rather, processingdata streams for identification of malicious content and fraudulent sources isthe main challenge.There have been numerous studies of graph mining, which has led to avariety of techniques for mining relational data. These techniques can beused to characterize the structural properties of social graphs that correspondto normal social behavior. This in turn can lead to methods for detectinganomalies, such as possible attacks, that do not conform to the expected socialbehavior. Although studies of snapshots of social networks can be used forsecurity research, tracking changes over time can give a better insight into thedynamic nature of the network and attackers’ behavior. Therefore, coping withthe dynamicity of data is another big challenge.In studies of social interactions between people, there is a trade-off betweensecurity and privacy. Data collection and the processing of user activity logscan lead to detection of compromised or malicious accounts in social networks;however, this has to be done in a privacy-preserving manner, otherwise it isnot practical.5.6 Example ProblemsWith respect to the above research gaps, the following example problems canbe defined.How can we arrive at a measure of confidence in the truthfulness of informationthat is disseminated through social networks? This is a challengingproblem, particularly in cases where the true identity and the trustworthinessof the source of information are not known, due to anonymity,and in cases where there are no other ways to verify the content.How can we collectively study the information collected from different sourcesin real time? There is a need for an engine for organizing real-time streamingdata gathe<strong>red</strong> from a variety of social sensing platforms, includingsocial networks [388]. How can we effectively parallelize and distributethe data stream processing and introduce methods for identifying cybercriminals based on the aggregated data?How can we utilize data mining techniques for discriminating between honestand malicious identities? The well-studied techniques for graph miningcan be deployed as a tool for combating cyber criminals. Although thestructural properties of social graphs have already been used againstSybil attacks and spam, much more can be done.40
6 Critical Infrastructure SecurityGreater in size than anything build so far, current critical infrastructures(CI) refer to systems or assets that are vital in modern society andeconomy. Water supply, electricity, transportation, financial services,health care and telecommunication are the most common examples of CIs. CIsare regulated by different rules and laws, and operated diversely from countryto country. In addition, CIs are influenced by non-technological factors such aspolitics or culture. According to the EU Directive 2008/114/EC [63], a CI is“an asset [...] which is essential for the maintenance of vital societalfunctions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being ofpeople, and the disruption or destruction of which would have asignificant impact [...] as a result of the failure to maintain thosefunctions.”Thanks to the evolution of information and telecommunication technology,controlling CIs remotely (e.g., over the Internet) is feasible and, more importantly,convenient. Therefore, CI actors (e.g., industries and governments)have been progressively incorporating IT systems to consolidate the operationof CIs, up to the point that CIs and IT systems have converged. The termcyber-physical system (CPS) is commonly used in this context to refer to theintegration of a physical (critical) system with a cyber (Internet-connected)system, which is typically an industrial control system (ICS). In the remainderof this section, we will use the term CI to refer to the critical infrastructure as apart of the physical environment, and the term CPS to refer to the systems thatcomprise and interconnect these infrastructures, thus including IT components(i.e., the ICSs).Security issues arise because two previously isolated worlds, the Internetand the CI systems, are now interconnected. When early CIs were created, neithersecurity nor misuse of the interconnected control system were conside<strong>red</strong>.As a matter of fact, Internet technology is itself an underlying, critical assetof modern CIs, because the ICSs that control them are often distributed (overremote, Internet-connected locations).This section highlights the most relevant security problems and the state ofthe art of CPSs, with a particular emphasis on the ICS part.
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14 Grand ChallengesOne of the most
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Part II: Related Work
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15. A Crisis of Prioritization•
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16. Forwardare accessible from the
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17. Federal Plan for Cyber Security
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24 Cyber Security Strategy of theEu
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24.2. Strategic PrioritiesProposed
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25 The Dutch National Cyber Securit
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25.1. ContextsInternet (e.g., smart
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Bibliography[1] 10 Questions for Ke
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Bibliography[45] SCADA & Security o
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Bibliography[88] A. Avizienis, J.-C
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Bibliography[130] G. Cluley. 600,00
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