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3. In Search of Lost Anonymity3.2 What Is Expected to Happen?Although this information will probably be lawfullycollected with the consent (or at least underthe tolerance) of the users involved, it should beexpected that parts of it will fall into the wronghands either: (i) through legitimate ways, such ascompany acquisitions; (ii) through cracks in thesystem, such as imperfect security mechanisms; or(iii) through illegitimate ways, including extortionand theft. It will not be surprising, for example, if such information aboutcandidates running for office is suddenly leaked just before election day. Similarleaks about company executives may happen just before important deals,such as company mergers, are due to be closed. Unfortunately, such misuse ofthe information will probably divert public focus from the important issues athand, such as the company merger, to surprising details about the candidates’or the directors’ past. And this is the real danger: losing one’s perspectiveon the important things in life in the turmoil of everyday trivia; losing sight ofevents that make history for the sake of details that make headlines.3.3 What Is the Worst That Can Happen?The effects of this publicly available private-life informationgo beyond the tabloid gossip. We are nottalking about juicy details of the lives of celebrities.We are talking about a generation of young peoplewho will not be able to grow up normally. A generationof people who will not be able to have a secret.A generation that will not be able to enjoy the trustof sharing a secret. A generation that will not beable to build relationships solidified by the act ofkeeping a secret. A generation that will not be ableto know the healing effect of being left alone, ageneration that will be forced to heal its wounds,if possible at all, in the scrutiny of the public eye.A generation of people who will never learn thatmistakes can be stepping stones towards success, but instead will live in fearof having their feet jerked from under them at any moment.How do we expect the next generation to take risks when all their actions,all their failures, and all their mistakes—which sometimes may be spectacular—will be on-line for public ridicule? How do we expect them to fall in love whenall their attempts, and unavoidable failures, will be there for public scrutiny?22
3.4. State of the ArtDo we build a zoo, put our children in a cage, and invite everyone to watch?Is this the healthy environment we are preparing for the next generation?3.4 State of the ArtTracking web browsing within a domain and across domains has long beenan issue with respect to user privacy [221]. Third-party domains appearas embedded components in a large number of distinct web sites. Theyare thus in a position to compile and correlate a user’s browsing activityduring visits to two or more of these sites. This practice has evolved fromunsophisticated approaches, e.g., the use of HTTP cookies, to more elaboratetechniques [160, 227], making it difficult for the average user to completelyevade them. Even the private or incognito mode offe<strong>red</strong> by modern browsersmay not be enough for users to escape tracking [78].Do Not Track [15, 16] is a browser technologywhich enables users to signal, via anHTTP header, that they do not wish to betracked by websites they do not explicitlyvisit. Unfortunately, there are no guaranteesthat such a request will be hono<strong>red</strong> by thereceiving site.We should not lose the sightof events that make history inthe cloud of issues that fueleveryday headlines.Krishnamurthy et al. [242] studied privacy leaks in online social networkingservices (SNS). They identified the presence of embedded content from thirdpartydomains, such as advertisement providers, in the interactions of a userwith the SNS itself, stressing that the combination with personal informationinside an SNS could pose a significant threat to user privacy.There has been significant work on the interplay between SNS and privacy.For example, there has been some focus on protecting privacy in SNSagainst third-party applications installed in a user’s profile within the socialnetwork [163, 177, 352]. Facecloak [263] shields a user’s personal informationfrom an SNS, and any third-party interaction, by providing fake informationto the SNS and storing actual, sensitive information in an encrypted form on aseparate server. The authors in FlyByNight [262] propose the use of public keycryptography among friends in a SNS so as to protect their information from acurious social provider and potential data leaks.Recent work has focused on how to support personalized advertisementswithout revealing the user’s personal information to the providing party.Adnostic [378] offers targeted advertising while preserving the user’s privacyby having the web browser profile users, through monitoring of their browsinghistory, and inferring their interests. It then downloads diverse content from theadvertising server and selects which part of it to display to the user. Similarly,RePriv [185] enables the browser to mine a user’s web behavior to infer23
Page 1: SEVENTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMMETHERED B
Page 4 and 5: The Red Book. ©2013 The SysSec Con
Page 7 and 8: PrefaceAfter the completion of its
Page 9 and 10: Contents1 Executive Summary 32 Intr
Page 11 and 12: 1 Executive SummaryBased on publish
Page 13: 1.2. Grand Challenges4. will have t
Page 16 and 17: 2. Introductionwho want to get at t
Page 18 and 19: 2. Introduction• Although conside
Page 20 and 21: 2. Introductionfuture, where each a
Page 22 and 23: 2. Introductiondrones), such sensor
Page 24 and 25: 2. Introductioncover our energy nee
Page 27: Part I: Threats Identified
Page 32 and 33: 3. In Search of Lost Anonymityguide
Page 35 and 36: 4 Software VulnerabilitiesExtending
Page 37 and 38: 4.1. What Is the Problem?infrastruc
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Page 41: 4.7. Example Problemstem mitigation
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Page 46 and 47: 5. Social Networksby such an applic
Page 48 and 49: 5. Social Networksdisasters. This r
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Page 61 and 62: 7.2. Who Is Going to Be Affected?so
Page 63 and 64: 7.5. State of the ArtFinally, ident
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Page 71 and 72: 8.4. State of the ArtAll the other
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10 Usable SecurityKeys, locks, and
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10.4. What Is the Worst That Can Ha
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10.6. Research Gaps10.6 Research Ga
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10.7. Example Problemsof value for
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11. The Botnet that Would not DieNu
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11. The Botnet that Would not Diefa
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11. The Botnet that Would not Dieti
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12. Malwarethan 128 million malware
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12. Malwareequipped with auto-updat
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12. Malwarethe introduction of App
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13. Social Engineering and Phishing
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14 Grand ChallengesOne of the most
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Part II: Related Work
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15. A Crisis of Prioritization•
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16. Forwardare accessible from the
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16. ForwardRecommendation 4: “The
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17. Federal Plan for Cyber Security
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17. Federal Plan for Cyber Security
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18. EffectsPlus18.1 Roadmap Structu
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18. EffectsPlus18.6 Identified Prio
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19. Digital GovernmentThe roadmap o
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20. Horizon2020• “Making cyber
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21 Trust in the Information Society
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21.2. Recommendationsallows for the
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22. ENISA Threat Landscape2. Malwar
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22. ENISA Threat LandscapeSocial Te
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22. ENISA Threat Landscapewriters w
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23. Cyber Security Research Worksho
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24 Cyber Security Strategy of theEu
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24.2. Strategic PrioritiesProposed
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25 The Dutch National Cyber Securit
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25.1. ContextsInternet (e.g., smart
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25.1. Contextsdefensive approaches
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25.2. Research Themesand radio broa
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25.2. Research Themesconsists of se
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25.2. Research ThemesRisk managemen
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AMethodologiesIn this appendix we o
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BSysSec Threats Landscape Evolution
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B.4. SysSec 2013 Threats LandscapeT
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B.4. SysSec 2013 Threats LandscapeS
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Bibliography[1] 10 Questions for Ke
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Bibliography[45] SCADA & Security o
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Bibliography[88] A. Avizienis, J.-C
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Bibliography[130] G. Cluley. 600,00
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Bibliography[172] D. Evans. Top 25
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Bibliography[214] ICS-CERT. Monthly
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Bibliography[253] C. Lever, M. Anto
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Bibliography[291] Mozilla. Browseri
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Bibliography[329] F. Raja, K. Hawke
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Bibliography[370] T. Telegraph. Bog
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Bibliography[407] W. Yang, N. Li, Y
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