22. ENISA Threat LandscapeSocial Technology is increasingly being leveraged for stealing informationand, primarily, identities. This is p<strong>red</strong>icted to grow into a “fake trust”effect that may one day be leveraged to build so-called social bots.Critical Infrastructures are concerning because they integrate different systemsfrom very diverse domains, each with peculiar security policies,practices and threats. On top of this, external factors such as politicalinstability and financial crisis impact negatively by creating, respectively,motivation for attackers and vulnerabilities (e.g., cheap equipment). Theincreasing BYOD practice, along with its security issues, constitute anadditional weak spot in the future critical infrastructures ecosystem.Trust Infrastructure. Operators of trust infrastructures are likely to becometargeted by offenders, whose goal is to compromise the chain of trust ofthe systems that rely on such infrastructures (e.g., social networks, webservices). In this regard, the ENISA report highlights a need for morepervasive education and training to increase the users’ awareness.Cloud Computing and Big Data Cloud services such as remote backup andapplication services have become a consumer product. This, togetherwith the massive use of social networks, yielded vast amounts of data,which are now an attractive target for attackers. Furthermore, the tightintegration of cloud services in mobile devices will lead to a larger cloudattack surface, which could be exploited to compromise data privacy andto collect intelligence to prepare targeted attacks.22.3 RecommendationsThe ENISA report gives a series of recommendations that highlight the importanceand usefulness of future threat landscapes in information securitymanagement. More precisely, rather than the typical list of recommendationfor authorities and decision or policy makers, the report points out a list of“open issues” that need to be addressed by future threat landscapes. As thisaspect is purely methodological, we present it in Section A.222.4 A Look at Industrial Threat Reports22.4.1 SummaryAt the beginning of each year, it is common for several security-related companiesto publish reports or blog entries in which they try to summarize thetrends they observed in the past and propose some threat p<strong>red</strong>ictions for theupcoming year. These are usually short term forecasts with a focus on technologyand practical issues more than on long term research directions. However,these reports are compiled by the best experts in the area, and therefore they134
22.4. Industrial Reportsrepresent the best information we can get to estimate what kind of problemswe will have to face in the short-term future.Therefore, we decided to complete this chapter on previous work on researchroadmaps by reviewing a number of industrial reports, looking forrecurrent patterns or common threats that we can reuse in our study. Inparticular, we cove<strong>red</strong> the threat forecast published by Microsoft [377], Imperva[216], WebSense [393], McAfee [271], Symantec [367], Kaspersky [232],Bullguard [115], and by the Georgia Tech Information Security Center [193].22.4.2 Common Threats and RecommendationsNot surprisingly, most of the p<strong>red</strong>ictions for 2013 have several points incommon. In particular, these are the main areas on which experts from variouscompanies seem to agree:Mobile Malware. The emergence of mobile malware is one of the main concernwe observed in the industrial reports. However, if the area itself iscertainly the major threat on the landscape, the way in which it is goingto materialize in the short term can vary. For instance, some experts seean increase in exploitation of vulnerabilities that target the OS and onthe development of drive-by downloads; others think that malware willfocus on the payment capabilities of phones to either steal informationor to purchase applications developed by the attacker. Some companieseven forecast the appearance of the first mass worm for Android devices.Finally, a common point in many reports is the likely increase of mobileadware, e.g., software that sends pop-up alerts to the notification bar,adds new icons, or change some of the phone settings.Cloud-Based Malicious Activities. Attackers will leverage cloud infrastructurein general, and IAAS in particular, to perform a wide range ofmalicious activities. According to the experts, these can range fromsimple denial of service attacks (paid with stolen c<strong>red</strong>it cards) to usingthe cloud to spread malware or to develop cloud-based botnets.Malware fighting back. An interesting point raised by several experts is thefear that malware writers will start adopting more sophisticated techniqueseither to hinder the analysis and detection, or to make theircommand and control infrastructures more resilient. For instance, itis expected an increase in the adoption of techniques to detect virtualmachines and in protection methods similar to those employed in DigitalRights Management (DRM) systems. Rootkits will also diversify, and willadopt new persistence mechanisms and bootkit techniques. McAfee alsothinks that botnets will become harder to take down because malware135
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SEVENTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMMETHERED B
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The Red Book. ©2013 The SysSec Con
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PrefaceAfter the completion of its
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Contents1 Executive Summary 32 Intr
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1 Executive SummaryBased on publish
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1.2. Grand Challenges4. will have t
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2. Introductionwho want to get at t
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2. Introduction• Although conside
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2. Introductionfuture, where each a
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2. Introductiondrones), such sensor
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2. Introductioncover our energy nee
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Part I: Threats Identified
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3. In Search of Lost Anonymity3.2 W
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3. In Search of Lost Anonymityguide
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4 Software VulnerabilitiesExtending
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4.1. What Is the Problem?infrastruc
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4.5. State of the Artparts of criti
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4.7. Example Problemstem mitigation
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5. Social Networks5.1 Who Is Going
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5. Social Networksby such an applic
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10 Usable SecurityKeys, locks, and
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11. The Botnet that Would not DieNu
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