5. Social Networks5.1 Who Is Going to Be Affected?As we bring our social interactions online, they can be tracked and recorded.Thus, it is not only the specific users of online social networks, such as Face<strong>book</strong>or Google+, that will be affected, but anyone who participates in a societythat is dependent on information and communication technology. The generationgrowing up now is the first to have been exposed from birth. As suchtechnology is continuously being integrated into our lives, it is to be expectedthat more information will be gathe<strong>red</strong> and more people will be affected inthe future.5.2 What Is Expected to Happen?We are already seeing attackers targeting the online social networks, such asFace<strong>book</strong>, Google+ and Twitter. By befriending strangers, cyber criminals canharvest private user data and access their contact lists to perform identity theft,clone user profiles, lure them to malicious websites, and send targeted spamand phishing messages.5.2.1 PrivacyUsers of online social networks tend to share private information, such aseducation, occupation, relationship status, current location, and personal habits.In the wrong hands, this information can be used to launch sophisticated andtargeted attacks against people. Even for individuals who are not users ofonline social networks, information about their social interactions can still beinfer<strong>red</strong> from public data, such as co-authorship information from DBLP [14].The problems caused by breaching privacy are described in more detail inChapter 3.5.2.2 SpamToday, email is not any more the only means forspreading spam, as spammers now use multiplecontent-sharing platforms, such as online socialnetworks, to increase their success rate. The informationprovided by users in their profiles, suchas education, profession, and relationship status,together with their real email address, providesspammers with a great opportunity to personalizetheir marketing activities and improve the efficiencyof the spam campaigns. Moreover, if a spam emailcontains personal information, such as the nameof the receiver, content-based spam detection toolsassign lower spam rates to it and it may therefore36
5.2. What Is Expected to Happen?evade detection. Hence, new filtering techniques are requi<strong>red</strong> to counterthis new type of spam. Third-party applications can also exploit vulnerabilitiesin users’ browsers, conduct cross-site scripting attacks, compromise theirmachines, form a botnet to launch malicious activities such as DoS attacks,propagate malware, or send spam email. One example is the Koobface botnet[93], which abuses social network sites. It starts by sending a spam messagecontaining a malicious link to a video which, once clicked, <strong>red</strong>irects the victimsto a website where they are asked to install an executable file. This file theninfects their machine with the Koobface malware.5.2.3 Sybil AttackIn addition to the propagation of spam and malware, multiple fake identities insocial networks can be used to out-vote honest users, influence online ratings,and manipulate search results [225]. Attackers can either compromise existingaccounts or generate fake (Sybil) accounts. The compromised accounts havealready established friendships with other users of the social network and aretrusted by them. Sybil accounts, however, need to establish friendships andgain trust before launching attacks, such as sending spam. Selling fraudulentor compromised social network accounts is even starting to overtake stealingc<strong>red</strong>it card numbers [275, 334].5.2.4 AuthenticationIn order to mitigate attacks from compromised accounts, mechanisms requiringmore than a password have been introduced, such as Social Authentication(SA) in Face<strong>book</strong> [173]. These types of mechanism require a user to providetwo distinct pieces of evidence in order to be authenticated. For example, in SA,users must provide a password and recognize pictures randomly chosen fromtheir friends’ pictures. Unfortunately, this type of authentication is vulnerableto advances in face recognition techniques [104, 318]. Different approaches toauthentication and authorization, as well as general problems that exist arecove<strong>red</strong> in Chapter 7.5.2.5 Third PartiesThird-party applications, which are widely deployed in online social networks,can also perform malicious activities, for example exploit vulnerabilities inusers’ browsers, conduct cross-site scripting attacks, compromise their machines,form a botnet to launch attacks such as denial of service [87], propagatemalware, and send spam.Moreover, malicious third-party applications that access private user datatend to store the information, or send it to advertising and Internet trackingcompanies, thus violating user privacy. Unfortunately, any data harvested37
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12. Malwarethan 128 million malware
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14 Grand ChallengesOne of the most
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Part II: Related Work
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15. A Crisis of Prioritization•
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16. Forwardare accessible from the
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17. Federal Plan for Cyber Security
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24 Cyber Security Strategy of theEu
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25 The Dutch National Cyber Securit
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25.1. ContextsInternet (e.g., smart
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B.4. SysSec 2013 Threats LandscapeS
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Bibliography[1] 10 Questions for Ke
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Bibliography[45] SCADA & Security o
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Bibliography[88] A. Avizienis, J.-C
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Bibliography[130] G. Cluley. 600,00
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Bibliography[172] D. Evans. Top 25
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Bibliography[214] ICS-CERT. Monthly
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