11. The Botnet that Would not Dietive mixing in P2P botnets and its consequences for network resilience andrecovery [409].To establish an idea of the threats we may expect from future P2P botnets,several researchers have designed their own theoretical highly resilient P2Pbotnets [213, 295, 360, 403, 404]. We are currently not aware of any existing P2Pbotnets based on ideas from these academic proposals.11.6 Research GapsWe envision Research in the area along the following dimensions:11.6.1 Prudent Counter-attacksAssuming the old ways no longer work in taking down botnets, what are thenew ways? Can we alert users that they may be infected without becomingtoo intrusive? Are there safe ways to penetrate other people’s computers andremove infections? This direction of research is not very popular today, as itrepresents what are known as offensive techniques. Most research departmentseschew such research. We believe that we need a better understanding of whatthe options are.11.6.2 LegislationCurrently, most countries lack a legal framework for dealing with these newadvanced botnets. We have no guidelines as to how and when we can takemore invasive measures against resilient malicious infrastructures. Nor is thereclarity as to who should do it. And there is even less clarity when it comes tostriking back at machines that are located in other countries (assuming youcan even tell). We need research into the desirability of such measures, theboundaries for such measures, etc.11.7 Example ProblemsTangible example problems might include:Legal boundaries for hacking back. Can we provide clear and intelligiblelegislation that clarifies under what circumstances the government isallowed to strike back at botnets? Which computers is it allowed toattack—just the ones in its own country or may borders be crossed ifneed be (and if so, under what circumstances)?Poisoned fruit. Rather than taking the P2P botnets down, can we disrupt theirefficiency sufficiently to make them less interesting for attackers? Forinstance, can we inject an overwhelming amount of fake data, so that itbecomes hard for the bot masters to extract the useful information?86
12 MalwareMost users and administrators of computer systems configure theirdevices by installing software of their choice according to theirneeds. Often, however, not all software running on a device is vettedby its owner. Malware, short for malicious software, is an umbrella termreferring to software that gets installed and operates against a user’s will,usually for the benefit of a third party. Categorized depending on propertiessuch as the malware’s infection and propagation strategy, stealthiness, andpurpose, common types of malware include viruses, worms, spyware, rootkits,keyloggers, backdoors, trojans, ransomware, and others [368].Viruses usually infect executable files or documents, and require some formof human intervention in order to spread, such as plugging in an infected USBflash drive (or, in older times, inserting a diskette), being tricked into clickingon a malicious URL or attachment, or intentionally installing a maliciousprogram disguised as (or contained in) a legitimate-looking application. Incontrast, worms are autonomous, self-replicating programs that spread acrossthe network by exploiting defects in widely-used software running on victimhosts. Other types of malware can be installed as a result of direct unauthorizedaccess to a computing device, manual intrusions (often involving some formof social engineering), or automated exploitation by malicious websites ordocuments.Historically, early viruses and worms were usually the outcome of experimentationand curiosity. Most of them were harmless, although they oftenunintentionally resulted in significant service disruption [165]. Fast forwarda couple of decades, when organized cybercriminals develop sophisticatedmalware with the aim of illegal financial gain, while governments employmalware for gathering intelligence or even tactical operations (as was the casewith the Stuxnet worm, discussed in Section 6.3).12.1 What Is the Problem?The rise in the number of malware variants continues at a steady pace. Indicatively,McAfee reports a growth in the number of new malware samples ofabout 8–12 million per quarter for 2012, while as of April 2013 they have more
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SEVENTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMMETHERED B
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The Red Book. ©2013 The SysSec Con
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PrefaceAfter the completion of its
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Contents1 Executive Summary 32 Intr
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1 Executive SummaryBased on publish
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1.2. Grand Challenges4. will have t
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2. Introductionwho want to get at t
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2. Introductionfuture, where each a
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2. Introductiondrones), such sensor
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3. In Search of Lost Anonymityguide
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4 Software VulnerabilitiesExtending
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4.5. State of the Artparts of criti
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24 Cyber Security Strategy of theEu
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25 The Dutch National Cyber Securit
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25.1. ContextsInternet (e.g., smart
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25.1. Contextsdefensive approaches
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25.2. Research Themesand radio broa
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25.2. Research Themesconsists of se
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AMethodologiesIn this appendix we o
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BSysSec Threats Landscape Evolution
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B.4. SysSec 2013 Threats LandscapeT
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Bibliography[1] 10 Questions for Ke
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Bibliography[45] SCADA & Security o
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Bibliography[88] A. Avizienis, J.-C
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Bibliography[130] G. Cluley. 600,00
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