10. Usable SecurityInternet, for example. Therefore, very complicated methods of securinga device are bound to be rejected by the masses.• Transparency: Even security-aware users can not always deduce howa system works and where the possibilities for attacks arise. A goodexample here is a registe<strong>red</strong> e-mail address that is used somewhere elsewithout notification to identify a user. There are threats for some usersthat cannot be anticipated without a deeper knowledge of the underlyingsystem.• Restrictiveness: Most security solutions impose restrictions on theirusers. Passwords must be ente<strong>red</strong> and memorized, device locks must beremoved before using a device, firewalls prohibit unconfined networkusage, etc. Users who see their devices as tools to do a job, which simplyhave to work properly, will gladly sacrifice security for convenience ifgiven the choice. Therefore, the choice of which options to give theend-user for circumventing or re-defining security-critical aspects has tobe a well-conside<strong>red</strong> one.To put it briefly, there are several reasons why a user may choose not to usethe security mechanisms provided, preferring to go with a more convenient,unsecu<strong>red</strong> solution instead. It is the researcher’s responsibility to keep thetarget system safe anyway. .10.2 Who Is Going to Be Affected?While the scope of the problem is hard to define precisely, the potentialvictims of this threat are more easily identified. This type of threat specificallyinfluences the everyday user of devices connected to the Internet. They simplycannot cope with the speed with which new technologies hit the market. Evenexperts such as network administrators, programmers and technically versatileindividuals have a difficult time keeping up with new developments, let alonethe possible threats they entail. Unfortunately, the ordinary end-user makes upthe vast majority of customers dealing with (personal) computers. Therefore,the target community is one of the largest imaginable; it essentially comprisesthe whole Internet.10.3 What Is Expected to Happen?The effects of the previously discussed development are already visible. Moreand more users fail to take precautions because they negatively impact theirworkflow. As a result, these systems are prone to various attacks, rangingfrom stolen passwords and account data to infected machines that do theiroperator’s bidding. If this trend continues, it will be virtually impossible to74
10.4. What Is the Worst That Can Happen?create secure systems without isolating them from external influences—asApple does with the App Store, for instance. Even then, a reluctant user whoignores updates, for example, can still fall victim to various attacks. It is,therefore, the research community’s task to consider how a possible solutionto a given problem might be easily adopted by the end-user.10.4 What Is the Worst That Can Happen?To take this thought even further, let us consider the two most extreme cases.In a hypothetic scenario, security precautions are so complicated to utilize,that no ordinary user is actually using them. Instead, every online action isconside<strong>red</strong> a public process. Consequently, the Internet for ordinary userswould lose a lot of potential and decrease to a pure information-retrievalfacility. Netbanking, online <strong>book</strong>ing, or even private messaging would not bepossible anymore.In the other extreme case, users would be forced to use all available securitymechanisms, for instance by a security policy. The result would essentially bethe same. With more restrictions and access control, usability decreases to apoint where it is no longer feasible to even use a device. An example couldbe online banking, that can only be used from a single IP address over a VPNtunnel, where passwords have to be changed with every login and one-timesecurity tokens are sent to a mobile device. While this method would certainlybe more secure than a conventional login/password, it would cause most usersto fall back to conventional manual wire transfers.In reality, such an extreme case will hopefully never occur. Still, there is anatural balance between usable security mechanisms and convenience. Thisbalance also exists in corporate systems, where security experts are confrontedwith the task to decide where to put the bar between user restrictions andsecurity.10.5 State of the ArtSo, what is the situation today? This question can obviously not be answe<strong>red</strong>with a simple good or bad. In 2005, Gutmann et al. made a very astute observation:a little more complexity is acceptable for a fair offering in value [202].It ultimately comes down to exactly this question. A security mechanism, ifnot enforced by the system itself, will only be accepted if it offers a certaindegree of added value. Usually, a trade-off between usability and security hasto be found. A trade-off, however, is always a compromise [112]. The resultis a system that is more complicated than one without security, but still lesssecure than it could be. Although acceptable, such a condition is certainly notdesirable. The optimal case would be a consensus between both categories.75
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SEVENTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMMETHERED B
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The Red Book. ©2013 The SysSec Con
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PrefaceAfter the completion of its
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Contents1 Executive Summary 32 Intr
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1 Executive SummaryBased on publish
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1.2. Grand Challenges4. will have t
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2. Introductionwho want to get at t
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2. Introduction• Although conside
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2. Introductionfuture, where each a
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2. Introductiondrones), such sensor
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2. Introductioncover our energy nee
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Part I: Threats Identified
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3. In Search of Lost Anonymity3.2 W
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20. Horizon2020• “Making cyber
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21 Trust in the Information Society
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21.2. Recommendationsallows for the
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22. ENISA Threat Landscape2. Malwar
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22. ENISA Threat LandscapeSocial Te
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22. ENISA Threat Landscapewriters w
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23. Cyber Security Research Worksho
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24 Cyber Security Strategy of theEu
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24.2. Strategic PrioritiesProposed
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25 The Dutch National Cyber Securit
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25.1. ContextsInternet (e.g., smart
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25.1. Contextsdefensive approaches
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25.2. Research Themesand radio broa
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25.2. Research Themesconsists of se
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25.2. Research ThemesRisk managemen
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AMethodologiesIn this appendix we o
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BSysSec Threats Landscape Evolution
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B.4. SysSec 2013 Threats LandscapeT
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B.4. SysSec 2013 Threats LandscapeS
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Bibliography[1] 10 Questions for Ke
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Bibliography[45] SCADA & Security o
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Bibliography[88] A. Avizienis, J.-C
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Bibliography[130] G. Cluley. 600,00
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Bibliography[172] D. Evans. Top 25
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Bibliography[214] ICS-CERT. Monthly
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Bibliography[253] C. Lever, M. Anto
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Bibliography[291] Mozilla. Browseri
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Bibliography[329] F. Raja, K. Hawke
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