7. Authentication and Authorizationeight character-long, NTLM-encrypted passwords in just about five hours [60].Yet another approach involves using cloud resources to quickly crack varioustypes of hashes [9]. If a salt is not used, cracking can be accelerated further byemploying rainbow tables [374].Once passwords are cracked, the attacker can do any of the following:• Access all information sto<strong>red</strong> in the service by other users.• Steal the identity of a victim or impersonate them.• Incriminate the user by carrying out questionable activities using theirprofile.• Escalate to more valuable assets. For example, accessing a victim’s webe-mail might be sufficient for compromising their e-banking account.7.4 What Is the Worst That Can Happen?A cautionary tale that shows what can happen when multiple services areinterconnected, all using weak authentication mechanisms, is the epic hack ofMat Honan, a reporter working for Wi<strong>red</strong>.com. In his own words [212]:In the space of one hour, my entire digital life was destroyed. Firstmy Google account was taken over, then deleted. Next my Twitteraccount was compromised, and used as a platform to broadcastracist and homophobic messages. And worst of all, my AppleIDaccount was broken into, and my hackers used it to remotely eraseall of the data on my iPhone, iPad, and MacBook.However, although Mat Honan experienced the dramatic consequencesof password theft, and eventually of losing control over his digital assets, hemanaged to sustain his quality levels along many critical dimensions. First, hedidn’t suffer from critical financial loss. Second, the health of his life was notin danger, and, third, he didn’t face heavy incrimination, connecting him withillegal actions and eventually making him face, wrongly, the consequencesof violating the law. Mat Honan may managed to escape from such seriousdangers because he was already famous, and he was more of a victim of a badprank, than a targeted attack.Nevertheless, password theft and, eventually, identity theft can lead to verybad consequences along all the above three dimensions. First, it is reportedthat financial loss from identity theft is increasing [19]. Note that the reportstates that year by year less people are victims, but the loss is greater. Second,although there are no reported cases of identity theft that can lead to lifethreateningsituations, a lot of medical data are sto<strong>red</strong> on-line, and passwordtheft can lead to privacy leaks associated with the health’s condition of a victim.54
7.5. State of the ArtFinally, identity theft can lead to serious incrimination, since today a user’ssocial profile and all activities connected with it can be strong evidence forcertain violations. For example, during the last Olympic Games many athleteswere expelled from the games for tweeting racially charged content [54].7.5 State of the Art7.5.1 Delegated Authentication and AuthorizationCommunication and resource sharing between web services is a desi<strong>red</strong> abilitythat benefits both users and services. The most straightforward way for serviceA to exchange information about a user with service B is for that user toprovide his c<strong>red</strong>entials for the latter. This carries security risks ranging fromthe unrestricted access service A receives to the compromise of the user’sc<strong>red</strong>entials as he shares them with more and more services. For that matter,delegated authentication and authorization methods have been developed asan alternative to the users’ providing their actual c<strong>red</strong>entials to a service.The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework [57] enables a third party to requestaccess to a c<strong>red</strong>ential-restricted resource from its owner and receive that accesswithout knowledge of the owner’s c<strong>red</strong>entials. For that to happen, the resourceowner authenticates with the resource server, using his c<strong>red</strong>entials, and obtainsan access token which can be used in place of the owner’s c<strong>red</strong>entials for therestricted resource. Moreover, the owner is able to limit the token’s capabilitiesso as to set a specific permission scope, lifetime and other attributes for thatthird party’s actions. The OpenID 2.0 authentication standard [41] provides away for an end user to prove ownership of a claimed identity to a third party.Its intended purpose is for users to log in to web services without registeringfor a new account as long as they already have a registe<strong>red</strong> identity withan OpenID provider. Users visit a web service and attempt to log in simplyby claiming an identity and specifying the OpenID provider that will verifytheir control over that identity. The web service indirectly, through the users’user-agent, requests and receives an assertion about their ownership of theclaimed identity from the OpenID provider.Face<strong>book</strong> Connect [419] is an attempt by the social network to build on topof both OAuth and OpenID to produce an authentication and authorizationframework combined with the social information and graph its users form.Other popular web parties such as Google [22] and Twitter [58] are doing thesame. BrowserID [291, 292] or Mozilla Persona is a single-sign-on mechanismthat uses e-mail addresses to represent user identities. Users are able to claiman e-mail address as their identity as long as they can prove ownership. E-mail providers take up the role of providing proof to a web service, in acryptography-secu<strong>red</strong> manner, that a given user-agent, trying to log in tothat service, has also managed to successfully authenticate itself to the e-mail55
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SEVENTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMMETHERED B
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The Red Book. ©2013 The SysSec Con
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PrefaceAfter the completion of its
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Contents1 Executive Summary 32 Intr
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Part II: Related Work
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15. A Crisis of Prioritization•
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16. Forwardare accessible from the
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16. ForwardRecommendation 4: “The
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17. Federal Plan for Cyber Security
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17. Federal Plan for Cyber Security
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18. EffectsPlus18.1 Roadmap Structu
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18. EffectsPlus18.6 Identified Prio
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19. Digital GovernmentThe roadmap o
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20. Horizon2020• “Making cyber
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21 Trust in the Information Society
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21.2. Recommendationsallows for the
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22. ENISA Threat Landscape2. Malwar
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22. ENISA Threat LandscapeSocial Te
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22. ENISA Threat Landscapewriters w
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23. Cyber Security Research Worksho
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24 Cyber Security Strategy of theEu
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24.2. Strategic PrioritiesProposed
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25 The Dutch National Cyber Securit
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25.1. ContextsInternet (e.g., smart
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25.1. Contextsdefensive approaches
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25.2. Research Themesand radio broa
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25.2. Research Themesconsists of se
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25.2. Research ThemesRisk managemen
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AMethodologiesIn this appendix we o
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BSysSec Threats Landscape Evolution
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B.4. SysSec 2013 Threats LandscapeT
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B.4. SysSec 2013 Threats LandscapeS
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Bibliography[1] 10 Questions for Ke
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Bibliography[45] SCADA & Security o
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Bibliography[88] A. Avizienis, J.-C
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Bibliography[130] G. Cluley. 600,00
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Bibliography[172] D. Evans. Top 25
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Bibliography[214] ICS-CERT. Monthly
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Bibliography[253] C. Lever, M. Anto
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Bibliography[291] Mozilla. Browseri
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Bibliography[329] F. Raja, K. Hawke
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Bibliography[370] T. Telegraph. Bog
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