11. The Botnet that Would not DieNugacheStormSality v3Sality v4WaledacZeroAccess v1ZeroAccess v2Kelihos v1Kelihos v2Kelihos v3MinerZeusabandonedactivedisabledJan 2006 Jan 2007 Jan 2008 Jan 2009 Jan 2010 Jan 2011 Jan 2012Figure 11.1: Lifetimes of botnet variants. Note that Sality has been up since2007.have received much attention from security researchers and law enforcementin takedown attempts [157,363]. In response, botnet controllers (botmasters)have designed and implemented new architectures to make their botnets moreresilient. Some botnets use fast-flux DNS, which relies on a large pool ofIPs belonging to compromised systems to mask out the actual address of anattacker-controlled mothership that delivers malicious content or runs scamcampaigns [296, 309].In addition, attackers have implemented domain generation algorithms(DGAs) to generate pseudo-random domain names used for C&C dynamically(e.g., depending on seed values such as the current date/time and Twittertrends) [85]. For instance, the Zeus DGA currently generates a thousanddomains a day.However resilient such botnets have become, they have not stopped securityresearchers and law enforcement from taking them down. This is not the casefor a new breed of botnets, based on peer-to-peer (P2P) technology, that appearto have been designed with resilience in mind.In a P2P botnet, bots connect to other bots to exchange C&C traffic, eliminatingthe need for centralized servers. As a result, P2P botnets cannot bedisrupted using the traditional approach of attacking critical centralized infrastructure.Figure 11.1 shows the lifespans of twelve different botnets based onP2P technology. Observe that ZeroAccess has been up since 2009. Inc<strong>red</strong>ibly,the Sality botnet which counts about a million nodes has been operationalsince 2007. In 2007, George W. Bush was still in the White House, nobody hadheard about Stuxnet, and Nokia still reigned supreme in the mobile phonemarket!To be sure, researchers did manage to take down several P2P botnets inthe past. The Storm and Waledac botnets were probably the most famous ofthese [211, 362]. Thus, P2P by itself does not provide resilience. The point isthat modern botnets explicitly incorporate resilience in their design, with fallbackC&C channels (often based on DGA recovery), heavy encryption, signed82
11.1. What Is the Problem?messages, slow peerlist exchanges, and reputation-based peer replacement.Moreover, unlike earlier P2P botnets like Storm and Waledac, almost all newP2P botnets use an unstructu<strong>red</strong> P2P infrastructure—which turns out to bemuch harder to take down.11.1.2 ResilienceWe will distinguish between different kinds of resilience for P2P networks:Intelligence gathering resilience: For many attacks on (and mitigation techniquesfor) P2P botnets, we need to find out who is infected and perhapseven the topology of the P2P network.Modern botnets are made resilient against intelligence gathering forinstance by keeping most bots behind NATs and firewalls (making themimpossible to crawl), not using explicit identifiers (making it impossibleto estimate the exact number of infected machines, as IP addresses areboth reused and renewed), not exchanging peers frequently and notexchanging many peers to begin with (making crawling very slow), etc.All these techniques are employed even today by botnets like Sality andZeus. For instance, Sality bots exchange peers once every 40 minutesand Zeus every 30 minutes. Moreover, Sality exchanges only a singlepeer at a time. A future botnet may be slower still. If you are too slow inmapping out the bots, the churn in the P2P network will have made yournumbers obsolete almost immediately. This limits the measures that youcan take based on these numbers. For instance, placing many peers inquarantine unnecessarily will probably not be acceptable.Disruption resilience: well-known attacks to disrupt P2P botnets includesinkholing (where all bots are <strong>red</strong>irected to an attacker-controlled machinecalled a sinkhole), and command poisoning (where we distribute spoofedcommands to other bots and/or transmit invalid messages). A simplemeasure against command poisoning is to protect the command usingsignatures and nonces (e.g., Kelihos and Sality v4 use RSA2048, whileZeroAccess uses RSA1024). Typically, encryption is used to prevent themfrom being visible in the network.Moreover, to sinkhole an unstructu<strong>red</strong> P2P botnet, it is crucial that we areable to poison other peers’ peer lists. Modern botnets spend considerableeffort to prevent this. For instance, by not exchanging many peers (e.g.,Sality exchanges only one peer at a time), not replacing peers with a highreputation (Sality), replacing peers in a non-p<strong>red</strong>ictable manner (e.g.,Sality picks peers at random, rather than recent ones, like Kelihos andNugache, or peers that are close like Zeus and Storm), by providing abackup C&C channels (such as Zeus’s DGA-based channel, or Kelihos’83
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SEVENTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMMETHERED B
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The Red Book. ©2013 The SysSec Con
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PrefaceAfter the completion of its
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Contents1 Executive Summary 32 Intr
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1 Executive SummaryBased on publish
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1.2. Grand Challenges4. will have t
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2. Introductionwho want to get at t
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2. Introduction• Although conside
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2. Introductionfuture, where each a
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2. Introductiondrones), such sensor
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2. Introductioncover our energy nee
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Part I: Threats Identified
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3. In Search of Lost Anonymity3.2 W
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3. In Search of Lost Anonymityguide
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4 Software VulnerabilitiesExtending
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4.1. What Is the Problem?infrastruc
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22. ENISA Threat Landscape2. Malwar
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22. ENISA Threat LandscapeSocial Te
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22. ENISA Threat Landscapewriters w
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23. Cyber Security Research Worksho
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24 Cyber Security Strategy of theEu
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24.2. Strategic PrioritiesProposed
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25 The Dutch National Cyber Securit
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25.1. ContextsInternet (e.g., smart
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25.1. Contextsdefensive approaches
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25.2. Research Themesand radio broa
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25.2. Research Themesconsists of se
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25.2. Research ThemesRisk managemen
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AMethodologiesIn this appendix we o
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BSysSec Threats Landscape Evolution
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B.4. SysSec 2013 Threats LandscapeT
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B.4. SysSec 2013 Threats LandscapeS
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Bibliography[1] 10 Questions for Ke
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Bibliography[45] SCADA & Security o
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Bibliography[88] A. Avizienis, J.-C
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Bibliography[130] G. Cluley. 600,00
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Bibliography[172] D. Evans. Top 25
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