25. The Dutch National Cyber Security Research AgendaICT and Internet could undermine its growth: it has been estimated thatincreased trust in Internet by consumers could provide an additional 1.4billion euro of online trade by 2014.Just as private individuals are concerned with privacy, companies areconcerned with their intellectual property and confidential information.Companies are faced with a rapid rise of ever more sophisticated cyberattacks aimed at corporate espionage.• Industrial Control Systems. SCADA (short for “Supervisory Controland Data Acquisition”) systems monitor and control large industrial establishments,such as chemical and nuclear plants, and large parts of thenational critical infrastructure, such as the water, gas and electricity supply.Disruptions in SCADA systems can have disastrous consequences,but their increasing reliance on ICT—including the Internet—has madethem vulnerable to remote attacks. Stuxnet is the most famous amongnumerous examples here. This is especially worrying as these systemsare attractive targets for hacktivism, cyber terrorism, and cyber war.Improving the resilience of the ICT-dependent critical infrastructurerequires research into these infrastructures as they exist today, to understandtheir interdependencies and judge their reliability in the faceof attacks, and research into more secure components (hardware, software,or communication protocols) that may be needed to build a secureinfrastructure.• Smart grid. A new piece of technical critical infrastructure very muchunder development today is the smart grid, the next-generation electricityand utilities network that uses ICT technology to provide two-way digitalcommunications between suppliers and appliances at consumers’ homes,including smart meters and in the near future also batteries in electriccars. Smart grids are being promoted as a way of addressing energyindependence, global warming and emergency resilience issues, but theincreased reliance on ICT also introduces new threats, to both the securityof the overall Grid and the privacy of individual users.• Finance. Financial institutions or their customers are increasingly oftenvictims of targeted cyberattacks, carried out by well-funded criminalorganizations, which are becoming ever more sophisticated. These attacksare costing millions to consumers, retailer, and financial institutions (e.g.,through skimming, stolen c<strong>red</strong>it-card numbers, DoS attacks on paymentinfrastructure) and undermine the trust that is crucial for the financialsystem to operate.Present security solutions (firewalls, intrusion detection systems) cannotcope with this level of sophistication. There is a clear need for new148
25.1. Contextsdefensive approaches that can deal with targeted attacks and exploitsof zero-day vulnerabilities. Identity fraud is also a major issue here.New payment schemes (e.g., using NFC mobile phones) may offer newtechnical and commercial possibilities, but also raise new security andprivacy concerns.• Transport & Logistics. Cars and transportation systems are increasinglymaking use of sophisticated software to carry out safety-critical processes,such as braking in cars. Drive-by-wire is already a reality, and in thenear future intelligent transportation systems will make use of largescalecommunication to optimize fuel consumption, <strong>red</strong>uce traffic jams,increase safety and implement smart tax charges, but this change alsobrings high security risks (e.g., it has been demonstrated that malware ina car could turn off the braking system). Moreover, the communicationmeans that are needed to implement the smart mobility paradigm willturn the car into an open system that is by definition open to cyberattacks.Cars are only one example. Whitehat hackers have shown that newair traffic protocols are susceptible to a wide range of attacks. Severalincidents in the past have shown that train services are vulnerable tosoftware problems. There is no doubt that this is true for most modernforms of transport.In logistics, the main challenge in the domain is to ensure businesscontinuity, while making the value chains as short and responsive aspossible. A shorter chain has fewer participants and thus lower cost.A responsive chain delivers goods and payments faster, again loweringcosts. However, in a shorter chain the risks of interruption of the logisticsand transport services will increase and thus business continuity riskswill increase.• e-Health. Processes in the health sector are increasingly being supportedby ICT. ICT is also the key enabler of new methods of providing care,as exemplified by ambient assisted living. However, patient data areoften spread across many care providers such as the general practitioner,dentist, specialist, physiotherapist, hospital staff, pharmacists and, ofcourse, the patient. Care providers must be able to access relevantinformation that is created and maintained by colleagues (e.g., medicationrecords), to take action in case of emergencies while still guaranteeingthe privacy of the patient’s data. The security of patient data is essentialto ensure that doctors obtain the correct information at the right time.The retention period for patient data is long (up to 70 years) and thisposes a significant challenge for the technical infrastructure that supportsthe healthcare system.149
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SEVENTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMMETHERED B
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The Red Book. ©2013 The SysSec Con
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PrefaceAfter the completion of its
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Contents1 Executive Summary 32 Intr
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1 Executive SummaryBased on publish
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1.2. Grand Challenges4. will have t
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2. Introductionwho want to get at t
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2. Introduction• Although conside
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2. Introductionfuture, where each a
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2. Introductiondrones), such sensor
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2. Introductioncover our energy nee
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Part I: Threats Identified
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3. In Search of Lost Anonymity3.2 W
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3. In Search of Lost Anonymityguide
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4 Software VulnerabilitiesExtending
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4.1. What Is the Problem?infrastruc
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4.5. State of the Artparts of criti
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4.7. Example Problemstem mitigation
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5. Social Networks5.1 Who Is Going
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5. Social Networksby such an applic
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5. Social Networksdisasters. This r
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6. Critical Infrastructure Security
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6. Critical Infrastructure Security
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6. Critical Infrastructure Security
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6. Critical Infrastructure Security
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7 Authentication and AuthorizationH
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7.2. Who Is Going to Be Affected?so
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7.5. State of the ArtFinally, ident
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7.6. Research Gapshashes and evalua
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8 Security of Mobile DevicesIn an e
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8.3. What Is the Worst That Can Hap
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8.4. State of the ArtAll the other
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8.6. Example Problemserated anomaly
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9. Legacy Systemsthe execution of a
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9. Legacy Systemsparts of the progr
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10 Usable SecurityKeys, locks, and
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10.4. What Is the Worst That Can Ha
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10.6. Research Gaps10.6 Research Ga
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10.7. Example Problemsof value for
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11. The Botnet that Would not DieNu
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11. The Botnet that Would not Diefa
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11. The Botnet that Would not Dieti
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12. Malwarethan 128 million malware
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12. Malwareequipped with auto-updat
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12. Malwarethe introduction of App
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13. Social Engineering and Phishing
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13. Social Engineering and Phishing
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- Page 173 and 174: Bibliography[1] 10 Questions for Ke
- Page 175 and 176: Bibliography[45] SCADA & Security o
- Page 177 and 178: Bibliography[88] A. Avizienis, J.-C
- Page 179 and 180: Bibliography[130] G. Cluley. 600,00
- Page 181 and 182: Bibliography[172] D. Evans. Top 25
- Page 183 and 184: Bibliography[214] ICS-CERT. Monthly
- Page 185 and 186: Bibliography[253] C. Lever, M. Anto
- Page 187 and 188: Bibliography[291] Mozilla. Browseri
- Page 189 and 190: Bibliography[329] F. Raja, K. Hawke
- Page 191 and 192: Bibliography[370] T. Telegraph. Bog
- Page 193 and 194: Bibliography[407] W. Yang, N. Li, Y