25. The Dutch National Cyber Security Research Agendabotnet tracking, analysis of criminal infrastructures, and classificationand clustering of malware). Likewise, we need reliable methods forestimating the number of infected machines and the effectiveness ofcounter-measures. At the same time, we need arrangements to shapethe socio-economic forces that fuel or mitigate the spread and impactof malware. From a historical perspective, we should study trends inmalware—as doing so prepares us for new threats in time. Unless theseissues are researched jointly, only partial solutions of limited value willbe available.While originating in criminal behavior, the magnitude and impact ofthe malware threat are also influenced by the decisions and behaviorof legitimate market players, such as Internet Service Providers (ISPs),software vendors, e-commerce companies, hardware manufacturers, registrarsand, last but not least, end users. Here, critical questions focuson economic incentives for the variety of market players. These can beshaped by self-regulation, state regulation and liability assignment.3. Attack detection, attack prevention, and monitoringMalicious code and human attackers use ICT technology to launch attacks.The attacks include large-scale denial-of-service attacks, epidemic virusdistribution, and stealthy attacks on high-value targets. Sometimes theattack is stealthy or even dormant, as in the case of backdoors, while inother cases, the attacks are very noisy. Monitoring systems and networkshelps to detect and prevent the attacks as early as possible.Technological research challenges include binary hardening, networkmonitors, IDS and IPS systems, and attack analysis. For instance, todetect and prevent attacks, we need techniques and tools to spot andremove vulnerabilities from software, and monitoring systems to raisean alarm when a system behaves in an anomalous manner. Likewise,compliance monitoring is important for spotting vulnerabilities (in systemsand organizations) as early as possible. From an organizational andmanagement perspective, we need research into policies and protocolsfor monitoring, auditing, etc. From a legal perspective, we need clearrules for what is and what is not permitted in monitoring (and by whom),as well as ways to enforce these rules.4. Forensics and incident managementForensics and incident management are related, but different activitiesthat follow in the aftermath of an attack. Incident management consists ofrecovery (e.g., salvaging as much of the compromised system as possible),but also restoring systems and state, and becoming operational againat minimal cost. Part of the non-technical side of incident management152
25.2. Research Themesconsists of setting up protocols and organizational structures for handlingthe incidents (who is in charge, who answers to whom, what role dovarious parties play, etc.)—all in the light of rules and regulations (such asthe general obligation to report information leaks). Another part will bethe assessment of such things like as: what was compromised, how badlywas it compromised, can the data manipulation be reverted, what needsmanual inspection, etc.? At the same time, it requires organizationalprocedures to deal with reviewing security protocols, disclosure to pressand public, assembling teams to deal with the recovery, etc.The goal of cyber forensics is to examine digital media in a sound mannerto identify, preserve, recover, analyze and present facts and opinionsabout the information. The first decision after an incident is an economicone. How essential is the compromised system? For example, in a criticalinfrastructure setting such as a power station, it may be more importantto get things up and running (without running the risk of a repeat) thanto gather forensic evidence. In a crime scene, however, highly skilleddigital forensics expertise is needed on-site as quickly as possible tocollect evidence in a way that will make it admissible in a court of law.This process requires deeply technical as well as legal knowledge. Liveforensics (forensics on a system that cannot be switched out, as in criticalsystems) and the attribution question (linking the criminal activity tothe criminals behind it) are examples of issues that urgently requireadditional research. The same is true for the legal side: what is admittedas what sort of evidence under what circumstances? Forensic evidencehas been used in a number of high profile cases and is becoming moreaccepted as reliable within US and European court systems. However,this is hampe<strong>red</strong> by a lack of standards for digital forensic evidence,especially with multiple parties providing it. Again, research is neededinto developing such standards and methods.5. Data, Policy and Access ManagementIn the application domains the variety of data plays a key role. However,the confidentiality, availability, authenticity and integrity requirementsfor different kinds of data can vary greatly, both in the technical as well asin the legal sense. For example, health records must be kept for 70 years,and therefore require strong security, whereas other data are almostephemeral, such as the data by RFID tags. In this area, we need computerscience research to develop data management techniques (possibly oververy long time scales), but also organizational procedures, to ensurecorrect handling of sensitive data, and research to make sure that thetechnical policies match the user’s mental models and understanding.153
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SEVENTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMMETHERED B
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The Red Book. ©2013 The SysSec Con
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PrefaceAfter the completion of its
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Contents1 Executive Summary 32 Intr
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1 Executive SummaryBased on publish
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1.2. Grand Challenges4. will have t
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2. Introductionwho want to get at t
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2. Introduction• Although conside
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2. Introductionfuture, where each a
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2. Introductiondrones), such sensor
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2. Introductioncover our energy nee
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Part I: Threats Identified
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3. In Search of Lost Anonymity3.2 W
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3. In Search of Lost Anonymityguide
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4 Software VulnerabilitiesExtending
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4.1. What Is the Problem?infrastruc
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4.5. State of the Artparts of criti
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4.7. Example Problemstem mitigation
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5. Social Networks5.1 Who Is Going
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5. Social Networksby such an applic
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5. Social Networksdisasters. This r
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6. Critical Infrastructure Security
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6. Critical Infrastructure Security
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6. Critical Infrastructure Security
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6. Critical Infrastructure Security
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7 Authentication and AuthorizationH
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7.2. Who Is Going to Be Affected?so
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7.5. State of the ArtFinally, ident
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7.6. Research Gapshashes and evalua
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8 Security of Mobile DevicesIn an e
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8.3. What Is the Worst That Can Hap
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8.4. State of the ArtAll the other
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8.6. Example Problemserated anomaly
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9. Legacy Systemsthe execution of a
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9. Legacy Systemsparts of the progr
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10 Usable SecurityKeys, locks, and
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10.4. What Is the Worst That Can Ha
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10.6. Research Gaps10.6 Research Ga
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10.7. Example Problemsof value for
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11. The Botnet that Would not DieNu
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11. The Botnet that Would not Diefa
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11. The Botnet that Would not Dieti
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12. Malwarethan 128 million malware
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12. Malwareequipped with auto-updat
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12. Malwarethe introduction of App
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13. Social Engineering and Phishing
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13. Social Engineering and Phishing
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13. Social Engineering and Phishing
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13. Social Engineering and Phishing
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- Page 157 and 158: 25.1. Contextsdefensive approaches
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- Page 165 and 166: AMethodologiesIn this appendix we o
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- Page 173 and 174: Bibliography[1] 10 Questions for Ke
- Page 175 and 176: Bibliography[45] SCADA & Security o
- Page 177 and 178: Bibliography[88] A. Avizienis, J.-C
- Page 179 and 180: Bibliography[130] G. Cluley. 600,00
- Page 181 and 182: Bibliography[172] D. Evans. Top 25
- Page 183 and 184: Bibliography[214] ICS-CERT. Monthly
- Page 185 and 186: Bibliography[253] C. Lever, M. Anto
- Page 187 and 188: Bibliography[291] Mozilla. Browseri
- Page 189 and 190: Bibliography[329] F. Raja, K. Hawke
- Page 191 and 192: Bibliography[370] T. Telegraph. Bog
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