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SEVENTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMMETHERED B
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The Red Book. ©2013 The SysSec Con
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PrefaceAfter the completion of its
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Contents1 Executive Summary 32 Intr
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1 Executive SummaryBased on publish
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1.2. Grand Challenges4. will have t
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2. Introductionwho want to get at t
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2. Introduction• Although conside
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2. Introductionfuture, where each a
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2. Introductiondrones), such sensor
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2. Introductioncover our energy nee
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Part I: Threats Identified
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3. In Search of Lost Anonymity3.2 W
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3. In Search of Lost Anonymityguide
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4 Software VulnerabilitiesExtending
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4.1. What Is the Problem?infrastruc
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4.5. State of the Artparts of criti
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4.7. Example Problemstem mitigation
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5. Social Networks5.1 Who Is Going
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5. Social Networksby such an applic
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5. Social Networksdisasters. This r
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7 Authentication and AuthorizationH
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8 Security of Mobile DevicesIn an e
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10 Usable SecurityKeys, locks, and
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10.6. Research Gaps10.6 Research Ga
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11. The Botnet that Would not DieNu
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11. The Botnet that Would not Dieti
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12. Malwarethan 128 million malware
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12. Malwareequipped with auto-updat
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12. Malwarethe introduction of App
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14 Grand ChallengesOne of the most
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Part II: Related Work
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15. A Crisis of Prioritization•
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16. Forwardare accessible from the
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17. Federal Plan for Cyber Security
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17. Federal Plan for Cyber Security
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18. EffectsPlus18.1 Roadmap Structu
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19. Digital GovernmentThe roadmap o
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