22. ENISA Threat Landscape2. Malware. Trojans are the most reported class of malware (also on mobiledevices). Trojan Autorun and Conficker worm are still two of the topthreats worldwide. Today, money making (e.g., through banking c<strong>red</strong>entialstealing) is the main motivation behind malware campaigns. WithKoobface, the miscreant have showed that social networks are an effectivedistribution channel.3. Code Injection Attacks. SQL injection attacks are today more popular thancross-site scripting attacks than in the past. Hacktivists rely on SQLinjection attacks against their target websites.4. Exploit Kits. Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) is a new and growing criminalbusiness. Modern criminals have a professional attitude, with supportand development services. The enabling “technologies” of MaaS are(1) exploit kits (packages that automate cybercrime) and a (2) plethoraof channels to deliver malware (malicious advertising, social networks,legitimate websites, malicious SEO).5. Botnets Within the MaaS phenomenon, botnets have become a commoditysince they switched from single-purpose (e.g., spamming, DDoS) to multipurposebotnets. For increasing the reliability of botnets, cybercriminalsrely on decentralized by peer-to-peer technologies (ZeroAccess botnets)and expand their surface to include mobile devices infected with specificmalware ported from desktop-based OSs.6. Compromising Confidential Information. 2011 has been addressed to asthe “year of security breaches.” Many sensitive database have beenleaked or targeted by attacks (e.g., healthcare, law enforcement). Accordingto the report, 9 out of 10 breaches would have been preventedthrough proper data protection and information security best practices.Indeed, besides targeted attacks, negligent, non-hostile insiders and webapplication vulnerabilities were the main cause of such breaches.7. Targeted Attacks have been increasing during the first half of 2012, withspear-phishing as the topmost common infection vectors against industrialcontrolsystems. Other tools used in targeted attacks include platformspecificmalware: Stuxnet, Duqu, and Flamer.8. Physical Theft/Loss/Damage. With the increased mobility of working locationsand with the bring-your-own-device practice, the probability of dataloss (even due to simple physical device theft) have increased in the lastyear. Unfortunately, the report highlights that full-device encryption isnot widely adopted, although this would be a good mitigation technique.132
22.2. Emerging Issues per Area9. Identity Theft is perpetrated through the spread of advanced trojans thatperform information stealing, rather than phishing, which was morepopular in the past. Mobile platforms are the main repository of sensitiveinformation: Indeed, cybercriminals have ported information-stealingmalware to such platforms (e.g., Android ZeuS in the Mobile, or ZitMo).10. Abuse of Information Leakage is increasing, due to new technologiessuch as geo location and social advertising platforms (e.g., Foursquare),which create new venues for tracking users and compromising theirprivacy. Also aggressive advertising is abused to track users trough theinformation (e.g., “permanent” cookies) leaked by web browser.11. Rogue Certificates are being leveraged to break the chain of trust. Indeed,in the last two years, the offenders have been stealing (see 6. CompromisingConfidential Information), producing and circulating roguecertificates. As a result, the criminals managed to conduct large-scale,man-in-the-middle attacks with stolen certificates.There are threats which instead show a stable trend. Among them, denial ofservice, mostly used by hacktivists, is leaving traditional low-level protocols(e.g., UDP, ICMP, and SYN flood) in favor of application layer protocols (e.g.,HTTP, service APIs), where more targeted denial of service attacks can bedesigned. An exception is the IPv6 layer, which was also targeted. Phishinghas been stable (i.e., uptime of phishing sites dropped in first half of 2012),probably leaving the floor to more effective means such as information stealers(e.g., ZeuS or SpyEye), which can collect two-factor authentication c<strong>red</strong>entials.However, cybercriminals are targeting VoIP systems via “vishing” (i.e., voicephishing) scams. Rogueware/scareware still be a problem, although the users aremore aware of these scams. Indeed, the report notices little technical evolutionin rogueware tools, although they are more widespread by leveraging thesame distribution channels used by regular malware (e.g., SEO poisoning).Noticeably, the first fake AV product that targets Macs appea<strong>red</strong> in 2011.Search engine poisoning is still one of the major methods used to drive users tomalware-distribution sites. SEO poisoning typically take advantage of eventsand trending topics to create campaigns that attract many victims.22.2 Emerging Issues per AreaThe report also presents a list of areas (i.e., assumed to grow), within whichthreat p<strong>red</strong>ictions are made from the current security issues.Mobile Computing is affected by cross-platform malware families (e.g., ZeuS,SpyEye), which impact is exacerbated by the widespread use of mobileplatforms for financial transactions. Unfortunately, the app stores arestill too immature to fight back.133
- Page 1:
SEVENTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMMETHERED B
- Page 4 and 5:
The Red Book. ©2013 The SysSec Con
- Page 7 and 8:
PrefaceAfter the completion of its
- Page 9 and 10:
Contents1 Executive Summary 32 Intr
- Page 11 and 12:
1 Executive SummaryBased on publish
- Page 13:
1.2. Grand Challenges4. will have t
- Page 16 and 17:
2. Introductionwho want to get at t
- Page 18 and 19:
2. Introduction• Although conside
- Page 20 and 21:
2. Introductionfuture, where each a
- Page 22 and 23:
2. Introductiondrones), such sensor
- Page 24 and 25:
2. Introductioncover our energy nee
- Page 27:
Part I: Threats Identified
- Page 30 and 31:
3. In Search of Lost Anonymity3.2 W
- Page 32 and 33:
3. In Search of Lost Anonymityguide
- Page 35 and 36:
4 Software VulnerabilitiesExtending
- Page 37 and 38:
4.1. What Is the Problem?infrastruc
- Page 39 and 40:
4.5. State of the Artparts of criti
- Page 41:
4.7. Example Problemstem mitigation
- Page 44 and 45:
5. Social Networks5.1 Who Is Going
- Page 46 and 47:
5. Social Networksby such an applic
- Page 48 and 49:
5. Social Networksdisasters. This r
- Page 50 and 51:
6. Critical Infrastructure Security
- Page 52 and 53:
6. Critical Infrastructure Security
- Page 54 and 55:
6. Critical Infrastructure Security
- Page 56 and 57:
6. Critical Infrastructure Security
- Page 59 and 60:
7 Authentication and AuthorizationH
- Page 61 and 62:
7.2. Who Is Going to Be Affected?so
- Page 63 and 64:
7.5. State of the ArtFinally, ident
- Page 65 and 66:
7.6. Research Gapshashes and evalua
- Page 67 and 68:
8 Security of Mobile DevicesIn an e
- Page 69 and 70:
8.3. What Is the Worst That Can Hap
- Page 71 and 72:
8.4. State of the ArtAll the other
- Page 73:
8.6. Example Problemserated anomaly
- Page 76 and 77:
9. Legacy Systemsthe execution of a
- Page 78 and 79:
9. Legacy Systemsparts of the progr
- Page 81 and 82:
10 Usable SecurityKeys, locks, and
- Page 83 and 84:
10.4. What Is the Worst That Can Ha
- Page 85 and 86:
10.6. Research Gaps10.6 Research Ga
- Page 87:
10.7. Example Problemsof value for
- Page 90 and 91: 11. The Botnet that Would not DieNu
- Page 92 and 93: 11. The Botnet that Would not Diefa
- Page 94 and 95: 11. The Botnet that Would not Dieti
- Page 96 and 97: 12. Malwarethan 128 million malware
- Page 98 and 99: 12. Malwareequipped with auto-updat
- Page 100 and 101: 12. Malwarethe introduction of App
- Page 102 and 103: 13. Social Engineering and Phishing
- Page 104 and 105: 13. Social Engineering and Phishing
- Page 106 and 107: 13. Social Engineering and Phishing
- Page 108 and 109: 13. Social Engineering and Phishing
- Page 111 and 112: 14 Grand ChallengesOne of the most
- Page 113: Part II: Related Work
- Page 116 and 117: 15. A Crisis of Prioritization•
- Page 118 and 119: 16. Forwardare accessible from the
- Page 120 and 121: 16. ForwardRecommendation 4: “The
- Page 122 and 123: 17. Federal Plan for Cyber Security
- Page 124 and 125: 17. Federal Plan for Cyber Security
- Page 126 and 127: 18. EffectsPlus18.1 Roadmap Structu
- Page 128 and 129: 18. EffectsPlus18.6 Identified Prio
- Page 130 and 131: 19. Digital GovernmentThe roadmap o
- Page 132 and 133: 20. Horizon2020• “Making cyber
- Page 135 and 136: 21 Trust in the Information Society
- Page 137: 21.2. Recommendationsallows for the
- Page 142 and 143: 22. ENISA Threat LandscapeSocial Te
- Page 144 and 145: 22. ENISA Threat Landscapewriters w
- Page 146 and 147: 23. Cyber Security Research Worksho
- Page 149 and 150: 24 Cyber Security Strategy of theEu
- Page 151 and 152: 24.2. Strategic PrioritiesProposed
- Page 153 and 154: 25 The Dutch National Cyber Securit
- Page 155 and 156: 25.1. ContextsInternet (e.g., smart
- Page 157 and 158: 25.1. Contextsdefensive approaches
- Page 159 and 160: 25.2. Research Themesand radio broa
- Page 161 and 162: 25.2. Research Themesconsists of se
- Page 163 and 164: 25.2. Research ThemesRisk managemen
- Page 165 and 166: AMethodologiesIn this appendix we o
- Page 167 and 168: BSysSec Threats Landscape Evolution
- Page 169 and 170: B.4. SysSec 2013 Threats LandscapeT
- Page 171 and 172: B.4. SysSec 2013 Threats LandscapeS
- Page 173 and 174: Bibliography[1] 10 Questions for Ke
- Page 175 and 176: Bibliography[45] SCADA & Security o
- Page 177 and 178: Bibliography[88] A. Avizienis, J.-C
- Page 179 and 180: Bibliography[130] G. Cluley. 600,00
- Page 181 and 182: Bibliography[172] D. Evans. Top 25
- Page 183 and 184: Bibliography[214] ICS-CERT. Monthly
- Page 185 and 186: Bibliography[253] C. Lever, M. Anto
- Page 187 and 188: Bibliography[291] Mozilla. Browseri
- Page 189 and 190: Bibliography[329] F. Raja, K. Hawke
- Page 191 and 192:
Bibliography[370] T. Telegraph. Bog
- Page 193 and 194:
Bibliography[407] W. Yang, N. Li, Y