12. Malwareequipped with auto-update functionality that allows malware operators to deployarbitrary code to the infected hosts. New malware versions are frequentlydeveloped and deployed; Panda Labs observed 73,000 new malware samplesper day in 2011 [67]. Clearly, the majority of these samples are not reallynew software but rather repacks or incremental updates of previous malware.Malware authors update their code in an endless arms race against securitycountermeasures such as anti-virus engines and spam filters. Furthermore, tosucceed in a crowded, competitive market they innovate, refining the malwareto better support cybercriminals’ modus operandi or to find new ways to profitat the expense of their victims. Understanding how malware is updated overtime by its authors is thus an interesting and challenging research problemwith practical applications. Previous work has focused on constructing thephylogeny of malware [208, 230]. However, quantifying the differences betweenversions can provide an indication of the development effort behind thisindustry, over the observation period. To provide deeper insight into malicioussoftware and its development, one needs to go a step further and identify howthe changes between malware versions relate to the functionality of the malware.This is the main challenge in today’s research. By utilizing techniquesthat combine dynamic and static code analysis to identify the component of amalware binary that is responsible for each behavior observed in a malwareexecution, the evolution of each component across malware versions can bemeasu<strong>red</strong>. By comparing subsequent malware versions, code that is sha<strong>red</strong>with previous versions and code that was added or removed can be identified.From the system-level activity, high-level behavior, such as downloading andexecuting a binary or harvesting email addresses, can be infer<strong>red</strong>. Aside fromrefining existing malware and introducing new techniques to evolve it, a certaintrend towards propagating malware to new platforms is certainly apparent.However, to date, Windows systems are still the main target of malware attacks.Even so, samples have started to trickle down to other operating systems, suchas Android or Mac OS. Given the growth of these markets, more sophisticatedforms of malicious code can be expected in the near future.12.6 Research GapsThe increasing sophistication of malware has exposed limitations in existingvirus scanners and malware detectors. Signature-based approaches cannotkeep up with malware variants that employ packing and polymorphism, necessitatingmore advanced malicious code scanning and analysis techniques.Approaches based on runtime behavioral profiling and detection are a promisingstep, and behavioral heuristics are supported to some extent by currentantivirus systems, but usually come as extra features not enabled by defaultdue to their increased runtime overhead and proneness to false alarms. Al-90
12.7. Example Problemsternative software distribution schemes based on whitelisting or strict vetting,such as the one followed by Apple’s App Store, <strong>red</strong>uce the chances of infection,but also limit the options of users to only those programs that have beenvetted. Attackers that manage to slip through the vetting process or even steal“clean” developer keys may have increased potential for successful malwa<strong>red</strong>istribution.Automated malware analysis systems face significant challenges due to theincreasing rate of new samples that must be analyzed on a daily basis, andthe need for more complex analysis for non-trivial samples. Given a certainmalware analysis infrastructure, more samples must be processed in a time unitand more cycles must be spent per sample. Factors that drive up the analysiscost include stealthy malware that uses polymorphism and metamorphism,anti-debugging and VM-detection techniques, dormant functionality, andenvironment-dependent malware.12.7 Example ProblemsProblems caused by malware are extremely common. In fact, most of today’sattack scenarios involve some sort of malware as an enabler. Some examplesinclude:Botnets. They are probably the best example of how malware is used formonetary gain. Botnets rely solely on unsolicited installations of maliciousprograms on ordinary computers to function. Other than targetedattacks, they aim at infecting ordinary users, who often may not knowhow to secure their systems properly. Chapter 11 provides detailed informationabout a Botnet’s modus operandi. The basic enabler for such aninstallation, however, is still Windows-based malware.Platform independence. Today, malware is still almost exclusively targeted atMicrosoft Windows operating systems. With the biggest market share,these systems are more widely distributed and, therefore, more valuable.Although mobile malware and malware for other operating systems,such as Mac OS or Linux, is definitely on the rise, widespread attackson these platforms have not yet had an impact on the general public—even though infections are often transmitted via Browser exploits ordrive-by-downloads, methods that are platform independent.(In)secure design. The most important problem, however, is the impossibilityto design completely secure systems. As a result, there will always be anarms race between systems developers and miscreants that try to infectthem with malware. There is, however, a noticeable shift in responsibilities.While open, general-purpose operating systems like Windows,Linux or Mac OS are ultimately the responsibility of the users themselves,91
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SEVENTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMMETHERED B
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The Red Book. ©2013 The SysSec Con
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PrefaceAfter the completion of its
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Contents1 Executive Summary 32 Intr
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1 Executive SummaryBased on publish
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1.2. Grand Challenges4. will have t
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2. Introductionwho want to get at t
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2. Introduction• Although conside
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2. Introductionfuture, where each a
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2. Introductiondrones), such sensor
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2. Introductioncover our energy nee
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Part I: Threats Identified
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3. In Search of Lost Anonymity3.2 W
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3. In Search of Lost Anonymityguide
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4 Software VulnerabilitiesExtending
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4.1. What Is the Problem?infrastruc
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4.5. State of the Artparts of criti
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4.7. Example Problemstem mitigation
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5. Social Networks5.1 Who Is Going
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5. Social Networksby such an applic
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24 Cyber Security Strategy of theEu
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24.2. Strategic PrioritiesProposed
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25 The Dutch National Cyber Securit
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25.1. ContextsInternet (e.g., smart
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25.1. Contextsdefensive approaches
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25.2. Research Themesand radio broa
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25.2. Research Themesconsists of se
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25.2. Research ThemesRisk managemen
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AMethodologiesIn this appendix we o
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BSysSec Threats Landscape Evolution
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B.4. SysSec 2013 Threats LandscapeT
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B.4. SysSec 2013 Threats LandscapeS
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Bibliography[1] 10 Questions for Ke
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Bibliography[45] SCADA & Security o
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Bibliography[88] A. Avizienis, J.-C
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Bibliography[130] G. Cluley. 600,00
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Bibliography[172] D. Evans. Top 25
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Bibliography[214] ICS-CERT. Monthly
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Bibliography[253] C. Lever, M. Anto
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Bibliography[291] Mozilla. Browseri
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Bibliography[329] F. Raja, K. Hawke
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