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131 LA UR 03 5862 - National Nuclear Security Administration ...

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2-38SWEIS Yearbook—2002Table 2.1.2-1. Plutonium Complex/Comparison of OperationsCAPABILITIES SWEIS ROD a 1998 OPERATIONS 1999 OPERATIONS 2000 OPERATIONS 2001 OPERATIONS 2002 OPERATIONSPlutoniumStabilizationManufacturingPlutoniumComponentsSurveillance andDisassembly ofWeaponsComponentsActinide Materialsand ScienceProcessing,Research, andDevelopmentRecover, process, andstore the existingplutonium inventory ineight years.Produce nominally 20war reserve pits peryear. (Requires minorfacility modifications.)Pit disassembly: Up to65 pits per yeardisassembled. Pitsurveillance: Up to 40pits per year destructivelyexamined and 20pits per year nondestructivelyexamined.Develop productiondisassembly capacity.Process up to 200 pitsper year, including atotal of 250 pits (overfour years) as part ofdisposition demonstrationactivities.On schedule with focuson highest priorityinventory items.There were no warreserve pits produced oraccepted by DOE fortransfer to the nuclearstockpile.Consistent with the NoAction Alternative, nomore than 20 pits weredisassembled and nomore than 20 pits wereexamined during 1998.Fewer than 200 pitswere disassembled orconverted in 1998.Highest priority itemshave been stabilized.The implementationplan is being modifiedbetween DOE and theDefense <strong>Nuclear</strong>Facilities Safety Boardwith a longercompletion schedule.There were no warreserve pits producedor accepted by DOEfor transfer to thenuclear stockpile. Fourdevelopment pits werefabricated inpreparation foreventual war reservefabrication.Less than 65 pits weredisassembled during1999.Less than 40 pits weredestructively examinedas part of the stockpileevaluation program (pitsurveillance) in 1999.Fewer than 200 pitswere disassembled orconverted in 1999.Highest priority itemshave been stabilized.The implementationplan is being modifiedbetween DOE and theDefense <strong>Nuclear</strong>Facilities Safety Boardwith a longercompletion schedule.There were no warreserve pits producedor accepted by DOEfor transfer to thenuclear stockpile. Twodevelopment pits werefabricated inpreparation foreventual war reservefabrication.Less than 65 pits weredisassembled during2000.Less than 40 pits weredestructively examinedas part of the stockpileevaluation program (pitsurveillance) in 2000.Fewer than 200 pitswere disassembled orconverted in 2000.Highest priority itemshave been stabilized.The implementationplan is being modifiedbetween DOE and theDefense <strong>Nuclear</strong>Facilities Safety Boardto be completed by2010.There were no warreserve pits produced oraccepted by DOE fortransfer to the nuclearstockpile.Less than 65 pits weredisassembled during2001.Less than 40 pits weredestructively examinedas part of the stockpileevaluation program (pitsurveillance) in 2001.Fewer than 200 pitswere disassembled orconverted in 2001.Highest priority itemshave been stabilized.The implementationplan has been modifiedbetween DOE and theDefense <strong>Nuclear</strong>Facilities Safety Boardto be completed by2010.There were no warreserve pits producedor accepted by DOE fortransfer to the nuclearstockpile.Less than 65 pits weredisassembled during2002.Less than 40 pits weredestructively examinedas part of the stockpileevaluation program (pitsurveillance) in 2002.Fewer than 200 pitswere disassembled orconverted in 2002.

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