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131 LA UR 03 5862 - National Nuclear Security Administration ...

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2.2.3 Operations Data for the Tritium FacilitiesNeither TRU nor mixed TRU waste was generated in 2000 and 2001. From 1998 through 2002, mostdata for operations at the Tritium Facilities were slightly below levels projected by the SWEIS ROD.An exception to this was the airborne releases of elemental tritium from WETF. During January 2001,approximately 7,600 curies of elemental tritium were released from the facility during a single event. Theother exceptions are the generation of 2,615 kilograms and 5,164 kilograms of chemical waste in 2001 and2002 from WETF. In 2001, 2,353 kilograms of chemical waste were generated from refrigerant replacementat TA-16-450. The 2002 waste volume is 3,464 kilograms over the amount projected in the SWEIS ROD.Over 4,000 kilograms of the 2002 chemical waste were generated from refrigerant replacement at TA-16-450.The outfall flows at the Tritium Facilities were below levels projected in the ROD for 1998 and 1999.(Appendix D provides information on outfall usage at <strong>LA</strong>NL.) In 2000, the NPDES outfall discharges fromTA-21 were significantly higher than those projected by the SWEIS ROD. This increase was a result of themethods used for estimating the flow. These outfalls discharge on a batch flow basis and one is seasonallyout of service. However, the Discharge Monitoring Reports from the Water Quality and Hydrology group arebased on infrequent sampling and assume round-the-clock flow, thus substantially overestimating the actualdischarge flow. With the 2001 implementation of the newly issued NPDES permit, the Water Quality andHydrology group has been able to acquire direct flow measurements for all outfalls enabling the use of realdata instead of estimates.During 2001, the cross-country transfer line, dedicated to the transfer of radioactive liquid wastes fromthe TA-21 Tritium Facilities to the TA-50 RLWTF, was taken out of service, flushed, drained, and capped.Environmental protection was the primary reason for removing this pipeline from service; it was a singlewalledpipe for its entire length (~two miles). Reduction of radioactive liquid waste volumes generated atthe TA-21 facilities enabled the line to be taken out of service; the smaller volumes can now be transportedfrom TA-21 to TA-50 or TA-53 by truck. The TSTA cooling tower blowdown was changed from the liquidradioactive waste system to the outfall on the southwest end of TA-21, Building 209.During 2002, the cross-country transfer line was mostly removed as part of land transfer. Operational datafrom 1998 through 2002 are summarized in Table 2.2.3-1. The 2002 TSTA releases for tritium in water vaporwere greater than estimated in the ROD because of the deactivation activities.2.2.4 Cerro Grande Fire Effects at the Tritium FacilitiesThreat of wildfire caused the Laboratory to close on Monday, May 8, 2000, and enter emergencyoperations. Because the closure was on a Monday, the Tritium Facilities were already in a safe condition frombeing in safe weekend configuration. During the fire, no damage was incurred at the Tritium Facilities. WhileTA-21 facilities were only remotely threatened by fire, the fire burned up to and around WETF at least threetimes. Because of previous fuel thinning at TA-16 around the WETF and onsite fire support during the fire, nofacility or office structures were damaged.During the Laboratory closure, the safety systems at the Tritium Facilities remained operational and thefacilities remained in safe weekend configuration. The Tritium Facilities were never placed into shutdownmode. Facility operations personnel responded several times to facility alarms and maintenance needs. Noincrease in tritium emission occurred as a result of the fire. Restoration of full operating capabilities (returningto operations) of the Tritium Facilities proceeded without problems or delays.A lessons-learned exercise was conducted after the fire with Tritium Facilities personnel. This resulted inseveral suggestions for personnel and system improvements that will improve safety should a similar incidentoccur in the future.2-50SWEIS Yearbook—2002

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