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and to realize common purposes” (Alberta Reference, at p. 395). In the same case, Dickson C.J.(dissenting) stated: “What freedom of association seeks to protect is not associational activitiesqua particular activities, but the freedom of individuals to interact with, support, and besupported by, their fellow humans in the varied activities in which they choose to engage”(p. 366).[21] Three of the six Justices sitting on the trilogy opined in obiter that s. 2(d) does not2011 SCC 20 (CanLII)protect collective bargaining. (Alberta Reference at p. 390, per Le Dain J., PSAC at p. 453, perMcIntyre J.) The reasons given included that collective bargaining is a “modern right”, that itsrecognition would go against the principle of judicial restraint, that s. 2(d) protects onlyindividual rights, and that s. 2(d) was not intended to protect the goals or objects of organizations(Alberta Reference at p. 391, per Le Dain J.; pp. 397 and 407 per McIntyre J.).[22] The trilogy was endorsed in Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v.Northwest Territories (Commissioner), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367 (“PIPSC”). Sopinka J., stated in hisreasons which appeared to be accepted by the other judges on this point: (1) “s. 2(d) protects thefreedom to establish, belong to and maintain an association”; (2) “s. 2(d) does not protect anactivity solely on the ground that the activity is a foundational or essential purpose of anassociation”; (3) “s. 2(d) protects the exercise in association of the constitutional rights andfreedoms of individuals”; and (4) “s. 2(d) protects the exercise in association of the lawful rightsof individuals” (p. 402).