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Services. Recognizing an employee association and requiring the employer to engage incollective bargaining are themselves substantive outcomes for which workers organize. In alabour context, as in other contexts, certain “procedures” are favoured because they are morelikely to produce a certain outcome.[266] The very requirement that the parties engage in collective bargaining tips theeconomic balance between parties in favour of the workers and, as such, constitutes a particular2011 SCC 20 (CanLII)outcome. Consequently, the act of engaging in the process itself constitutes a concession on thepart of the employer. Were it not so, organized labour would have little reason to demandconstitutional protection for the “right” to engage in a process of collective bargaining.[267] In addition to providing the substantive benefit of requiring employers to meet withworkers, the duty to bargain in good faith brings other, more specific substantive benefits. Asthe term is understood in Canadian labour law, the duty to bargain in good faith prohibits anemployer from flat out refusing to bargain with the union or from only going to a few cursorymeetings: G. Adams, at p. 10-122. However, it also goes much beyond that. Depending on thecircumstances, the duty to bargain in good faith can prohibit an employer from refusing toinclude or discuss the inclusion of standard industry terms in a collective agreement or,conversely, insisting on the inclusion of a term to the point of impasse: see Adams, at pp. 10-111to 10-112; Royal Oak Mines Inc. v. Canada (Labour Relations Board), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 369, atpara. 45, per Cory J. It also obligates employers to disclose material information to unions inadvance of negotiations: Adams, at pp. 10-124 to 10-128. All of these aspects of the duty to