View cases - Stewart McKelvey

[101] Sections 5(6) and (7) are critical. They provide that the employer shall listen to oralrepresentations, and read written representations, and acknowledge having read them. They donot expressly refer to a requirement that the employer consider employee representations in goodfaith. Nor do they rule it out. By implication, they include such a requirement.[102] Three considerations lead us to conclude that any ambiguity in ss. 5(6) and (7)should be resolved by interpreting them as imposing a duty on agricultural employers to consider2011 SCC 20 (CanLII)employee representations in good faith.[103] The first consideration is the principle that a statute should be interpreted in a waythat gives meaning and purpose to its provisions. This requires us to ask what the purpose of therequirements in ss. 5(6) and (7) is. There can only be one purpose for requiring the employer tolisten to or read employee representations — to assure that the employer will in fact consider theemployee representations. No labour relations purpose is served merely by pro forma listeningor reading. To fulfill the purpose of reading or listening, the employer must consider thesubmission. Moreover, the employer must do so in good faith: consideration with a closed mindwould render listening or reading the submission pointless.[104] The second consideration is that Parliament and legislatures are presumed to intendto comply with the Charter: Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, atp. 1078, per Lamer J. (as he then was), dissenting in part; R. v. Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2, [2001] 1S.C.R. 45, at para. 33. At the time the AEPA was adopted Dunmore had pronounced that theCharter requires meaningful exercise of the right to associate in pursuit of workplace goals.