View cases - Stewart McKelvey

[283] It is true, as my colleagues say, that the words “listen to” and “read” and “give theassociation a written acknowledgment” neither impose nor preclude a duty to bargain in goodfaith. However, this does not lead to ambiguity. A duty to bargain in good faith, as discussedabove, is a term of art in labour law that carries with it a complex series of reciprocal rights andobligations (see Adams, at pp. 10-111 to 10-112, 10-122, 10-124 to 10-128). Where good faithbargaining is protected by statute it is explicitly included: see, for example, s. 17 of the Ontario2011 SCC 20 (CanLII)Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1. Sched. A, which requires that parties “shall bargainin good faith and make every reasonable effort to make a collective agreement”. To simplyimply the existence of a set of statutory rights by the absence of a well-known term of artstretches the interpretive exercise beyond its breaking point.[284] The Chief Justice and LeBel J. say that “[t]here can only be one purpose forrequiring the employer to listen to or read employee representations — to assure that theemployer will in fact consider the employee representations” (para. 103). They argue that thisleads to the conclusion that s. 5 includes a duty on employers to engage in collective bargainingwith employee associations.[285] The purpose of the AEPA is set out expressly in s. 1:1. (1) The purpose of this Act is to protect the rights of agricultural employeeswhile having regard to the unique characteristics of agriculture, including, but notlimited to, its seasonal nature, its sensitivity to time and climate, the perishability ofagricultural products and the need to protect animal and plant life.(2) The following are the rights of agricultural employees referred to insubsection (1):