View cases - Stewart McKelvey

[342] It strikes me as fundamentally contrary to our jurisprudence to invite the Tribunal tointerpret its home statute in a way that contradicts the clear statutory language and legislativeintent. If, on the other hand, the AEPA had included the protections set out in Health Services,the Tribunal would certainly have the authority to address and remedy any bargaining disputesand would therefore comply with what is required by s. 2(d).[343] This brings us finally to whether the process of good faith bargaining for agricultural2011 SCC 20 (CanLII)workers requires that the employer bargain only with the union selected by a majority of theemployees in the bargaining unit. This is known as the principle of majoritarian exclusivity, aroutine protection in Canada’s labour laws. In the context of this case, and given the uniquevulnerability of agriculture workers, I agree with Winkler C.J.O. that statutory recognition ofsuch exclusivity is essential for them to exercise their bargaining rights meaningfully.[344] As long ago as 1944, when Labour Ministers from across Canada agreed to theprinciples which found their way into the model The Industrial Relations and DisputesInvestigation Act, S.C. 1948, c. 54, majoritarian exclusivity was a central protection. Mostprovinces quickly aligned their legislation with these principles (Adams, at paras. 1.240-1.250).[345] With the exception of specific public services and the construction industry inQuebec (An Act respecting labour relations, vocational training and workforce management inthe construction industry, R.S.Q., c. R-20), majoritarian exclusivity has remained a definingprinciple of the Canadian labour relations model (Rayner, at p. 16; Carter et al., at para. 574).