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[34] Dunmore established that claimants must demonstrate the substantial impossibilityof exercising their freedom of association in order to compel the government to enact statutoryprotections. It did not, however, define the ambit of the right of association protected by s. 2(d)in the context of collective bargaining. Relying on Dunmore, the majority of the Court in HealthServices, per McLachlin C.J. and LeBel J., held that legislation and government actions thatrepealed existing collective agreements and substantially interfered with the possibility of2011 SCC 20 (CanLII)meaningful collective bargaining in the future constituted a limit on the s. 2(d) right of freedomof association.[35] The claimants were various unions and their members working in the health servicesindustry of British Columbia. The industry was highly unionized and had negotiated collectiveagreements regarding salaries, benefits and working conditions. The government, directly orindirectly, was the employer. The government wanted to reduce costs by changing the structureof its employees’ working arrangements in ways that would have been impermissible under theexisting collective agreements. It chose to do so, not through collective bargaining to the end ofaltering those collective agreements, but by the simple expedient of legislation. In short, thegovernment used its legislative powers to effectively nullify the collective agreements to itsbenefit, and to the detriment of its employees. The legislation not only conflicted with existingcollective agreements, but also precluded collective bargaining in the future on a number ofissues and conditions of employment. (See R. K. Basu, “Revolution and Aftermath: B.C. HealthServices and Its Implications” (2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 165, at p. 177; see also M. Coutu, L. L.Fontaine and G. Marceau, Droits des rapports collectifs du travail au Québec (2009), at p. 144.)