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collective?” (2010), 51 C. de d. 353. Indeed, some commentators fault this Court’s decision fornot going far enough in protecting collective bargaining and related issues: see e.g. P. Verge,“La Cour suprême, le ‘droit’ à la négociation collective et le ‘droit’ de grève” (2006), 66 R. du B.391; P. Verge, “Inclusion du droit de grève dans la liberté générale et constitutionnelled’association: justification et effets” (2009) 50 C. de D. 267; J. Cameron, “The LabourTrilogy’s Last Rites: B.C. Health and a Constitutional Right to Strike” (2009-2010), 152011 SCC 20 (CanLII)C.L.E.L.J. 297; and J. Cameron, “Due Process, Collective Bargaining, and s. 2(d) of the Charter:A Comment on B.C. Health Services” (2006-2007), 13 C.L.E.L.J. 233.(x) The Argument on Canadian Labour History[89] Rothstein J. takes issue with the discussion of Canadian labour history in HealthServices, pointing out that hostility to collective bargaining is part of Canadian labour lawhistory. We agree with this obvious fact, which was largely true until the Second World War,which is indeed referred to in the majority reasons in Health Services.[90] The relevant question from the perspective of interpreting s. 2(d) of the Charter isnot whether courts in the past have undermined collective bargaining, but rather whetherCanadian society’s understanding of freedom of association, viewed broadly, includes the rightto collective bargaining in the minimal sense of good faith exchanges affirmed in HealthServices. Whether that right has been consistently guaranteed by the legal system does notresolve the issue before us, the content of the s. 2(d) guarantee. Charter guarantees must be