View cases - Stewart McKelvey

associations must receive identical freedoms under s. 2(d). Rather, it was the application of thatapproach that correctly led them to recognize that a guarantee protecting a fundamental freedomto associate must be interpreted in a content-neutral fashion as between different associations.[209] The protection of fundamental freedoms should not involve the Court in adjudicatingthe relative values of the way in which individuals exercise those freedoms. Just as this Courthas not adjudicated on the relative value of a religion or its tenets under s. 2(a) or assessed the2011 SCC 20 (CanLII)relative value or content of a given exercise of freedom of expression under s. 2(b), so too shouldthis Court not privilege some associations over others under s. 2(d): Syndicat Northcrest v.Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, at para. 50.[210] Another example of a content-neutral approach can be found in Big M where thisCourt found:In my view, however, as I read the Charter, it mandates that the legislativepreservation of a Sunday day of rest should be secular, the diversity of belief andnon-belief, the diverse socio-cultural backgrounds of Canadians make itconstitutionally incompetent for the federal Parliament to provide legislativepreference for any one religion at the expense of those of another religiouspersuasion. [Emphasis added; p. 351.]Big M considered the purpose of the Charter, recognized the Christian underpinning of theimpugned law, and concluded that by imposing “a sectarian Christian ideal, the Lord’s Day Actworks a form of coercion inimical to the spirit of the Charter and the dignity of all non-