View cases - Stewart McKelvey

obligations, and Charter values — do not support conferring a constitutionalright to collective bargaining and imposing a duty on employers to engage incollective bargaining.c. Third, the majority’s approach to collective bargaining in particular and s.2(d) in general articulated in Health Services is unworkable. It extends2011 SCC 20 (CanLII)constitutional protection to the duty to bargain in good faith without importingother aspects of the Wagner framework, and by purporting to protect theprocess of collective bargaining without also protecting its fruits, neither ofwhich is tenable.3. Section 2(d) protects the ability of individuals to form associations and to do inassociation what they can lawfully do alone. Because individuals are generallyfree to bargain with their employer individually, it follows that s. 2(d) mustprotect the decision of individuals to come together, to form a bargaining positionand to present a common and united front to their employers. However, just as anemployer is not obliged to bargain with an individual employee, s. 2(d) does notoblige an employer to bargain with a group of employees.VII. Application to the Present Case[276] I agree with the conclusions of the Chief Justice and LeBel J. that the AEPA does notviolate s. 2(d) of the Charter, but for the reasons I have given. Section 2(d) does not confer a