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or effect of a measure when determining whether it infringes a person’s freedom of association(paras. 16-18).[164] However, there may be cases in which the state has directly targeted theassociational aspects of an activity which are not captured by Sopinka J.’s fourth proposition.An activity performed on a group level may be “qualitatively” different from what an individualcan undertake in isolation, such that no direct comparison or analogy is possible. If one were to2011 SCC 20 (CanLII)interpret the fourth proposition as requiring a strict analogy between the collective activity andits individual counterpart, a state restriction on such “qualitatively” different activities would notbe considered to inhibit freedom of association and would therefore pass muster under s. 2(d).Recognizing this, Dunmore attenuated the requirement of an individual analogue. If it can bedemonstrated that a restriction on a group activity is an attack on the associational nature of theactivity, a s. 2(d) claim may yet succeed even if no direct analogy can be made between thegroup activity and a lawful individual counterpart.[165] This observation about how “qualitatively” different activities exist was aimed atexplaining why certain activities which did not have an individual analogue must be protected inorder to protect the freedom to form an association. The disposition in Dunmore turned onwhether the lack of protection for agricultural employees was a “substantial interference” to theability of workers to form an association (paras. 22-23). To suggest, in hindsight, that “[a]fterDunmore, there could be no doubt that [s. 2(d)] extends to realization of collective, as distinctfrom individual, goals” as the Chief Justice and LeBel J. say at para. 32 (emphasis added), is tosubstantially overstate the holding in Dunmore.