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ight of collective bargaining; nor does it impose a duty on employers to meet with employeesand “consider employee representations in good faith” (para. 104). I agree with Farley J. that theAEPA satisfies all of the concerns raised in Dunmore ((2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 219).[277] On a plain reading of the provisions of the AEPA it provides all of the protectionswhich were imposed by this Court in Dunmore, but goes no further. It does not provide any rightto collective bargaining, or other incidents of Wagner Act collective bargaining. Indeed up to2011 SCC 20 (CanLII)this point, the parties and the Courts have all proceeded on the basis that the AEPA did notinclude a duty of collective bargaining. The claimants chose to bring this case because in theirview, the AEPA did not include provisions to enforce a duty of collective bargaining onagricultural employers. Based on this Court’s ruling in Dunmore that s. 2(d) did not create aright of collective bargaining, Farley J. ruled that the AEPA did not violate the Charter. HealthServices subsequently expanded the scope of s. 2(d) to constitutionalize the right to collectivebargaining. Thus the Court of Appeal was obliged to and did find that the AEPA was no longerCharter compliant. Both of these conclusions were entirely consistent with the text of the AEPAand the parties’ understanding that the AEPA did not include a duty of collective bargaining onagricultural employers.[278] By enacting the AEPA, the legislature precisely addressed this Court’s ruling inDunmore. The text, context and purpose of the AEPA clearly demonstrate that the legislatureintentionally opted not to include a duty on employers to engage in collective bargaining withemployee associations.